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ABSTRACT 
Humans and animals alike make thousands of decisions each day, and good 
decision-making is crucial to survive and thrive in a competitive world. Much research 
has focused on how to make ‘rational’ decisions based on stable and absolute 
preferences. In reality, however, human and animal decisions are extremely context 
dependent. We show and act on relative rather than absolute preferences (e.g., relative 
to irrelevant options, previous choices, or what others receive), and these tendencies can 
lead to consistently ‘irrational’ behavior. Studying the flaws in our cognitive system can 
help us learn how it works. This dissertation explored the extent to which we share 
several such decision-making biases with other primates. In a series of manual and 
computerized tasks, capuchin monkeys’ and rhesus macaques’ choices shifted in 
response to theoretically irrelevant factors like the presence of unattainable options, 
inferior options, or social partners; how much work they had previously invested; and 
how frequently different stimuli were encountered. These findings suggest that 
evolutionary ancient mechanisms can underlie similar biases in humans, highlighting 
the need to evaluate the potential function of decision-making strategies in a species’ 
physical and social environment. However, seemingly minor aspects of the 
experimental paradigms, like monkeys’ baseline preferences or whether information 
about the reward contingencies was signaled, affected the magnitude of these biases. 
Such methodological details may contribute to mixed evidence for decision-making 
biases in animals and need to be assessed systematically for comparative research to 
make valid inferences. In doing so, studying whether species other than humans make 
similar mistakes allows us to better understand the underlying cognitive mechanisms 
and the evolutionary forces that shape them. 
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Abstract 
Humans make thousands of decisions every day, and in some situations, we make 
reliably bad ones. Much research has explored the circumstances in which such 
irrational decision-making occurs, but the underlying mechanisms are often unclear. 
One approach that has recently gained traction is to study other species’ responses to 
similar scenarios to better understand our own decision-making strategies. Here we 
provide a critical discussion of experimental studies of decision-making biases in 
animals. We begin by demonstrating how comparative research can yield unique 
insights into our own decision-making that cannot be gained from studying humans 
alone. In particular, while comparative research helps us better understand how and 
why decision-making biases have evolved and which mechanisms underlie them, such 
studies often overlook how these behaviors vary, both within and between individuals. 
Methodological concerns and a lack in the diversity of species studied and the number 
of animals tested complicate this issue and can limit the inferences we can draw. We 
emphasize the need to study why and when some animals would be expected to show 
these biases while others would not. Further, rather than just assess whether a given 
bias is present, comparative research should measure the extent to which it is. We argue 
that studying how susceptibility to biases varies both within and between individuals is 
crucial to better understanding the nature of irrational decision-making. We suggest 
3 
practical steps that open up exciting avenues for future comparative research in this 
area.  
Keywords: decision-making, cognitive bias, rationality, comparative psychology 
 
Introduction 
Good decision-making is critical to the everyday lives of humans and animals alike. For 
animals, bad decisions can easily result in death or reproductive failure; for humans, in 
dire financial straits or toxic relationships. But what makes for a good decision? How 
can we evaluate decision-making objectively? Traditional economics provides 
benchmarks for optimal strategies in different situations (e.g., rational choice theory: 
von Neumann and Morgenstern 2007). Such theories typically assume that decision-
makers have full information and the ability to use it. As a result, rational decision-
makers should form stable and absolute preferences. However, we rarely do so in the 
real world. We are frequently influenced by factors that – according to such normative 
theories – should not matter (e.g., how a question is worded), and, as a result, we make 
consistently suboptimal decisions in certain situations. Our preferences can change 
based on how options are presented and which ones are available, on who else is 
watching or what they receive, or on what might have been (nudge theory: Thaler 1980, 
1992, 2016; Kahneman et al. 1982; e.g., behavioral game theory: Camerer 2003; prospect 
theory: Kahneman 2011). Although it is now well known that we often do not behave 
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rationally, there is no unified framework that explains when or how we fail to do so 
either. This issue is complicated because it is not always clear what behavior counts as 
irrational in the first place. For example, some perspectives define rationality in relation 
to a species’ cognitive system and environmental conditions rather than in relation to 
traditional economic principles (Kacelnik 2006; e.g., bounded rationality: Camerer 1998; 
Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; Gigerenzer and Selten 
2001; Gigerenzer and Todd 1999; ecological or biological rationality: De Petrillo and 
Rosati 2019; Stevens 2012; The Modelling Animal Decisions Group et al. 2014). 
Irrational tendencies can lead to paradoxical behavior with real-world 
consequences. For example, we prefer a longer and more painful sequences if the pain 
tapers off, are less happy if we have more options, and reject free, no-strings-attached 
money if we see the situation as unfair (Camerer 2003; Redelmeier et al. 2003; 
Scheibehenne et al. 2010; Chernev et al. 2015). Of course, other people are not immune 
to these biases either, and their decisions can deeply impact our lives as well. For 
example, marketing strategies can affect how much money you spend on a travel 
package, and countries’ policies can affect whether you become an organ donor or 
whether your child picks healthy foods in the cafeteria (Johnson and Goldstein 2004; 
Thaler and Sunstein 2009; Hanks et al. 2012; e.g., Cadario and Chandon 2019). Such 
irrational tendencies can also affect cornerstones of democracy and branches of 
government, e.g., when the wording on the ballot affects your votes, or when how well 
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a judge slept or when they last ate affects your court case (Bütler and Maréchal 2007; 
Danziger et al. 2011; e.g., Burnett and Kogan 2015; Eren and Mocan 2016; Cho et al. 
2017).  
Given the wide-spread and dramatic consequences that decision-making biases 
can have on our lives, it is important to understand why we fall for them. If we want to 
make better decisions, we need to know why and under what circumstances we make 
bad ones. This is true for individual decision-makers, but it is particularly important for 
policymakers to recognize that humans are not always rational. From this knowledge, 
they should responsibly design decision contexts that elicit our inherent values and 
preferences without distorting them. However, because humans operate in complex 
physical and social environments in the real world, there are often multiple possible 
explanations for what causes our decision-making to go awry. For example, problem-
solving skills and strategies may be rooted in biological predispositions and may be 
expressed differently depending on the cultural environment and may change over 
development. These influences are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, disentangling 
their role in bad decision-making is crucial because they have different implications for 
how to address them in order to lead to better choices. One approach to this problem is 
to study decision-making in other species, which not only gives us model systems free 
of many of these other influences but also helps clarify the evolutionary history of these 
decision-making behaviors, which can help us understand their potential function in 
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solving problems we encounter in our environments. Incidentally, a better 
understanding of bad decision-making may also yield a better understanding of good 
decision-making, because the same psychological processes are likely involved. 
In this paper, we demonstrate how studying decision-making biases in other 
species can help us better understand their evolutionary roots and their underlying 
mechanisms. We discuss several decision-making biases to demonstrate 1) what 
comparative studies can tell us, 2) what challenges comparative researchers face, and 3) 
where we can go from here.  
 
Insights From Studies of Animal Decision-making Biases 
The comparative approach 
Comparing the behavior of multiple species, including humans, is the only way to 
systematically assess both similarities and differences in how we make decisions. Doing 
so is vital to understanding how these behaviors have evolved, which mechanisms are 
at work, and under which circumstances they might have been adaptive. This is 
important not just for good decisions that we make but particularly for bad ones, 
because they can be costly both for the individual and for society as a whole. 
Understanding such decision-making biases from an evolutionary perspective is 
advantageous if we want to predict when they occur and learn how to overcome them. 
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Similarities in the behavior of different species can result from two processes – 
homology and convergent evolution (Lorenz 1958; Rendall and Di Fiore 2007; 
Ereshefsky 2007). Behavior is homologous if it occurs in species that share a common 
ancestor who behaved in the same way. As a result, phylogenetically closely related 
species may behave more similarly than more distantly related species. For example, 
dominance patterns may be homologous among primates (Rajecki and Flanery 2013), 
suggesting that dominance may have been adaptive for the primate common ancestor, 
for example, as a response to social conflict. However, through convergent evolution, 
similar behavior can also arise in distantly related species, not due to common descent, 
but in response to the same selection pressure. Such cases can be particularly 
informative because the similarities in the ecologies of the species that show a given 
behavior can help generate hypotheses about its function and adaptive value. For 
example, inhibitory skills in primate species covary with the degree of fission-fusion 
dynamics (a form of social complexity in which primate groups split into and merge 
from variable subgroups) rather than with phylogenetic history. Specifically, apes do 
not categorically perform better than monkeys, suggesting that inhibitory control may 
have conferred an evolutionary advantage in potentially risky social interactions (Amici 
et al. 2008). 
Importantly, although multiple species may show similar outcomes and a 
behavior can even serve the same function, it may arise from different psychological 
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processes. For example, in a two-player coordination game, humans and rhesus 
macaques adopted a reward-maximizing strategy that led to nearly identical overall 
payouts, but people did so by matching their (simulated) partners whereas the monkeys 
developed a preference for the option that paid well most of the time (Brosnan et al. 
2012b; Parrish et al. 2014). Comparative studies provide a unique way to constrain 
hypotheses about these underlying mechanisms. If other animals show similar behavior 
to humans, we can conclude that psychological processes unique to humans, such as 
human language, culture, or experience with financial institutions are not necessary for 
it to arise or may not affect how the behavior is expressed. Conversely, if we see a given 
behavior only in a specific species or group of species (e.g., only in humans or only in 
cetaceans), we can focus on the cognitive processes that may be specific to those 
organisms. Thus, although each species and population is subject to unique ecological 
influences, we can hone in on what causes a given behavior by examining the pattern 
across species through convergent research. 
In this way, much comparative research has established areas in which we are 
indeed unique as well as areas in which we are not (Fig. 1.1). For example, humans are 
unrivaled in our ability to innovate by transmitting and building on the knowledge of 
previous generations, to work with others in teams comprising thousands of people 
spanning the globe, and to use these abilities to go to space and uncover the mysteries 
of the universe. But animals other than humans certainly also use tools (Sanz et al. 
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2013), cooperate at sometimes large scales (Dugatkin 1997), and show some forms of 
culture (Laland and Galef 2009). Thus, comparative research often shows that the 
difference between us and other animals may be one of degree rather than kind. Of 
course, different species often express behaviors differently (e.g., behaviors that involve 
extensive use of language in humans), but the degree to which we share them with 
other species provides distinct insights into how and why they evolved and helps us 
better understand the mechanisms that lead us to make both good and bad decisions. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 A simple 2x2 classification for human decision-making phenomena in 
comparison to animals. 
 
Distinguishing between abilities that we share with other animals and those we 
do not also provides a unique perspective into how to improve our decision-making 
approaches. For example, if ant colonies can find the optimal strategy in complex 
problems through simple individual-level heuristics, then humans may not need 
computationally intensive algorithms to solve similar problems either. Ants effectively 
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and efficiently self-organize along lanes on their trails to adjust to heavier traffic, 
avoiding traffic jams but actually achieving greater speeds at higher traffic densities 
(Hönicke et al. 2015). These findings may help us develop improved traffic control 
measures that do not necessarily require complicated equipment and flow algorithms. 
Other endeavors, like colonizing the solar system, of course, rely to a large extent on 
human-unique abilities (e.g., human language), technologies (e.g., computers), and 
institutions (e.g., markets), and will need to optimize these aspects in order to succeed. 
 
Mechanisms underlying decision-making biases 
Using the comparative approach to study biases in decision-making can tell us whether 
humans are also uniquely daft in some situations or whether we share some of these 
irrational tendencies with other animals (Fig. 1.1). Similar to drawing this distinction for 
exceptional abilities, thinking about bad decision-making in comparison to other 
animals can lead to different implications for how to fix it. If only humans show a given 
bias, we may focus on tweaking human-unique features, such as aspects of digital 
communication, our financial institutions, or our education systems to elicit better 
decision-making. On the other hand, if other species show similar behavior, we know 
that it does not require human-unique mechanisms and can instead consider the role of 
more widely shared processes.  
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This rationale has been used to demonstrate, for example, that other animals like 
birds (Marsh and Kacelnik 2002) and monkeys (Lakshminarayanan et al. 2011) show 
framing effects – accepting more risk when outcomes are presented as losses than when 
the same outcomes are presented as gains. Similarly, comparative research found that 
apes and monkeys show the endowment effect – the tendency to overvalue items we 
own – in some situations (Brosnan et al. 2007, 2012a; Lakshminaryanan et al. 2008; 
Kanngiesser et al. 2011; Flemming et al. 2012; Drayton et al. 2013). These results 
challenge the idea that these hallmark economic decision-making biases (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979; Kahneman et al. 1991, 2008; Knetsch 2000) are unique to humans and 
have to rely on, for example, interactions with formal economic markets. Consequently, 
both good and bad decisions may often result from simpler cognitive rules than 
previously recognized.  
Of course, that does not necessarily mean that human-unique mechanisms play 
no role at all, both because several mechanisms may be involved and because the same 
outcomes may arise from different mechanisms. For example, the endowment effect in 
animals seems to be limited to food or tools that can be used immediately to obtain it 
(Brosnan et al. 2007, 2012a). Thus, human psychological processes are not necessary for 
endowment effects to arise, but they may explain why humans show it in broader 
contexts. Importantly, these differences in how widely the effect is expressed has 
prompted new inquiries into whether the “evolutionary salience” of the item may 
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explain the variation we see in humans as well (Jones and Brosnan 2008), highlighting 
that comparative research can yield unique perspectives and testable predictions about 
human decision-making behavior. 
One key feature of most decision-making biases that is obscured in all of these 
discussions (and our inferential statistics) is the often significant variability seen across 
individuals within species. Addressing this issue is important to assessing the stability 
of decision-making biases. Most basically, understanding this variability will help to 
clarify how different contexts influence decision-making, particularly if the same 
individuals respond differently across contexts. Moreover, different individuals may 
respond differently to the same context, suggesting that personality or preference may 
influence decisions. Here we discuss new research on the sunk cost effect and cognitive 
set bias and highlight that the extent to which animals show a given bias may vary not 
just across species but also across individuals or within individuals across trials or 
sessions. For further demonstrations of the comparative approach in the study of other 
decision-making phenomena, see reviews by Rosati and Stevens (2009), Santos and 
Chen (2009), Santos and Rosati (2015), Zentall (2016, 2019), and Williamson et al. (2019). 
 
Sunk cost effect 
Humans frequently take prior investments into account when making decisions. This 
susceptibility to irrecoverable sunk costs is irrational because we should only consider 
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the future expected costs and benefits when making a decision. If you get more from 
selling your car than not selling it (e.g., because of running costs), you should sell it, 
regardless of how much you bought it for. People and organizations alike tend to 
persist in an endeavor to a greater extent the more resources (e.g., time, money, or 
energy) we have already invested (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Arkes and Ayton 1999), and 
this can lead to bad decisions. For example, the sunk cost effect may exacerbate a 
country’s economic losses, cause a scientist to waste time on a doomed project, or make 
you finish (and later regret) a meal when you are already full. Indeed, this bias is 
sometimes called the Concorde fallacy, after the Concorde airplane project that wasted 
millions in funding even after it had become clear that it was a “commercial disaster” 
(Central Policy Review Staff 1971). 
There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon, none of which are 
mutually exclusive, making it even trickier to tease them apart. People may rationalize 
their earlier decisions as sound rather than mistaken in order to justify continued 
investment (Staw and Fox 1977; Staw and Ross 1989; Staw and Hoàng 1995), may strive 
to avoid waste (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Arkes 1996; Arkes and Ayton 1999; Arkes and 
Hutzel 2000), may persevere until they are more certain of the outcome (Bragger et al. 
1998; Navarro and Fantino 2005), or may shun a definite large loss (if they cut their 
losses) when a small additional investment may – but may not! – turn things around 
with a large gain (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Thaler 1980; Tversky and Kahneman 
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1981). However, disentangling these theories empirically has been difficult because they 
make similar predictions – that the sunk cost effect increases with the size of the sunk 
cost.  
The comparative approach presents one way to address this issue and to better 
understand the cognitive mechanisms underlying the sunk-cost effect. To the extent 
that human language and culture underlies tendencies such as self-justification and 
waste avoidance, these explanations would not predict a susceptibility to sunk costs in 
animals. On the other hand, if, for example, a more universal response to resource 
scarcity underlies waste avoidance in humans, then we would expect to find some 
evidence of the sunk cost effect in other animals as well. Similarly, uncertainty 
reduction and loss aversion, which do not rely on such human-unique factors, could 
account for sunk cost effects in animals. In fact, testing the effect in multiple animal 
species may help disentangle these possibilities even further if species differ in whether 
or how they express these behaviors. For example, to date, only starlings and capuchin 
monkeys have shown a human-like reflection effect by becoming more risk prone when 
prospects were framed as losses compared to the same prospects framed as gains 
(Marsh and Kacelnik 2002; Lakshminarayanan et al. 2011), although, to our knowledge, 
no other species have been tested in these paradigms. To the extent that the sunk cost 
effect arises as a result of loss aversion, we would expect it to emerge in species that 
overvalue losses in this way. Conversely, if loss aversion does not covary with the sunk 
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cost effect, this suggests that it is not a major factor in making the bias emerge, 
including in humans. 
Several animal species have now shown sunk cost effects both in the field and in 
the laboratory (Magalhães and White 2016). Ecological studies have mainly focused on 
parental investment in birds to assess whether sunk costs affect at what point parents 
stop raising the current offspring and start investing in the next. In line with the sunk 
cost effect, parents’ nest defense behavior increases the more they have already invested 
(Weatherhead 1979; Dawkins and Brockmann 1980). However, because parental 
investments are often indicative of brood value, it is unclear to what extent the future 
costs and benefits – which should be taken into account – rather than sunk costs – 
which should not be taking into account – can explain these findings.  
In the laboratory, where these factors are more easily controlled, pigeons and rats 
also show consistent sunk cost effects. They are more likely to complete a reinforcement 
schedule (rather than abandon it) the more pecks or lever presses they have already 
completed (Navarro and Fantino 2005; Macaskill and Hackenberg 2012; Magalhães et al. 
2012). For example, pigeons completed one of four random fixed ratio schedules, where 
the schedule that required the fewest pecks was the most common (Navarro and 
Fantino 2005). Importantly, pigeons could opt out and skip to the next trial at any point 
by pecking the escape key. In this situation, you should peck for the minimum number 
of times and escape if that does not yield a reward, i.e., when one of the three longer 
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schedules is in effect. This is the optimal response because, on average, completing the 
longer trials takes more pecks than starting a new, most likely short trial. However, 
three out of four pigeons persisted in almost all trials and failed to use the escape key. 
This effect disappeared when the cost of persisting was increased (i.e., when the longer 
schedules required many more additional pecks) and when the change in reward 
schedule was signaled (i.e., when the key changed color when the minimum number of 
pecks was completed). These results suggest that continued investment may, in part, 
arise from uncertainty about when it becomes more beneficial to quit than to continue, 
particularly if the cost to continue is small. 
More recently, rats and mice have also shown sunk cost effects when they 
needed to wait rather than act repeatedly in order to persist (Sweis et al. 2018). In this 
clever design, the rodents foraged for four different reward options by moving around 
a testing area with separate compartments. In each room, they could choose whether to 
move to the next room or whether to accept a waiting time for a reward (the duration 
was signaled through sounds of varying pitch to remove uncertainty). If they accepted 
an offer by entering the wait zone of the room, the countdown began, and the rodents 
received a food pellet if they waited until the end of the countdown. Once again, they 
could leave at any time during the waiting period but would forfeit the reward and the 
work (waiting) that they had already committed. Optimally, you should finish all trials 
that you are willing to commit to; otherwise, you should simply opt out and consider a 
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different offer. Consequently, if you commit to a waiting time, then the time that you 
have already spent waiting (i.e., sunk costs) should not affect whether you will wait 
until the end. That is, if you commit to waiting for 10 seconds, you should be just as 
likely to finish the trial when the wait time just started and when you have waited 9 
seconds and only have 1 second left. However, in line with the sunk cost effect, rats and 
mice were more likely to finish a trial the longer they had already waited (Sweis et al. 
2018).  
Unexpectedly, this effect did not depend on the time that rodents spent making 
their initial choice about whether or not to commit, even though it also detracted from 
the rodents’ total time budget. Thus, decisions about continued investment may arise 
from two different evaluation processes – an initial one involved in opting in or out of 
an investment and a secondary one involved in whether to continue investing. Only the 
latter process may be susceptible to sunk costs. Not only does this study demonstrate 
that animals can show sunk cost effects even when information uncertainty and the 
need for automated motor responses (such as pecking or lever pressing) are removed, 
but it highlights how studies of animal decision-making can generate novel hypotheses 
about human behavior as well. Indeed, the authors tested human participants using a 
similar procedure, in which they “foraged” for four categories of video clips and were 
shown a “download bar” that indicated the wait times. Humans showed the same 
pattern of results; they were more likely to wait until the end the longer they had 
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already waited, but this was unaffected by how long they initially took to decide 
whether to “download” the video (Sweis et al. 2018). 
These findings suggest that very distantly related species share our susceptibility 
to sunk costs in some situations. This bias therefore does not require tendencies to self-
justify or to avoid waste, which are arguably unique to humans. Uncertainty about the 
remaining effort also cannot explain this behavior, because the wait times were signaled 
(through sounds) both in the offer and wait zones. While several cognitive mechanisms 
may be at play, it is informative that widely shared and likely evolutionarily ancient 
processes can be sufficient. One possibility is that animals rely on heuristics that use 
past investments as a proxy for future benefits or that increase the perceived value of 
the reward with increased effort and therefore increased energetic depletion. In other 
words, the cupcake seems better (and worth waiting longer for) the hungrier you get. In 
this way, comparative research can constrain our hypotheses about the cognitive 
mechanisms that underlie decision-making biases in cases in which humans are not 
uniquely daft (Fig. 1.1).  
 
Cognitive set bias 
One way we navigate complex environments with limited and imperfect information is 
by taking past investments into account, as illustrated by sunk cost effects. Another way 
we deal with this problem is by relying on learned rules, which often save us time and 
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cognitive resources because we know what has worked in the past. This strategy is 
particularly useful if we are likely to encounter the same problem again. Of course, 
humans and animals alike make decisions in many different situations and those 
situations change over time. When the context for a decision changes, our learned rules 
of thumb can become inefficient or altogether ineffective. It is important for us to 
recognize when familiar rules may no longer work and to adopt alternative strategies 
that are more beneficial in these situations. However, if we are too receptive to new 
possibilities, we risk making bad decisions because we get distracted by irrelevant 
information. For example, a foraging animal may starve if it is unable to adapt to 
shifting environments; yet if foraging habits are too flexible, it may frequently consume 
novel and potentially poisonous food items. Thus, optimal behavior requires a balance 
between exploiting known solutions and exploring alternatives. 
Humans are creatures of habit in this respect. For example, in the classic water 
jar task, participants had to measure out specific amounts of water using three water 
jars of different sizes (Luchins 1942). Participants had to complete practice problems in 
which they were “given” three water jars that could each hold a fixed amount of water 
and had to fill and empty them to measure out a target quantity (Fig. 1.2). After 
completing several problems that could be solved by a single, multi-step rule (fill Jar B, 
then pour water from it to fill Jar A once and Jar C twice), people were given critical 
problems that could also be solved using a simpler rule (fill Jar A and pour water into 
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Jar C once). Participants overwhelmingly persisted in using the longer solution. 
Humans have since shown this cognitive set, or Einstellung, bias – the tendency for a 
learned approach to block the use of a better alternative – in a variety of task designs 
(Duncker 1945; Luchins and Luchins 1950; Aftanas and Koppenaal 1962; Sweller et al. 
1982; Ruscio and Amabile 1999; Arrington and Logan 2004; Chrysikou and Weisberg 
2005; Bilalić et al. 2008b, a; Crooks and McNeil 2009; ErEl and Meiran 2011; Thomas and 
Didierjean 2016). 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Schematics of the water jar problem (Luchins 1942) and the LS-DS task 
(Pope et al. 2015). In practice problems (left), participants learn to reach the target 
through a multi-step sequence. In probe trials (right), they can still use the familiar 
strategy, but could instead also use a more efficient shortcut.  
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Interestingly, other primates do not seem to share this cognitive inflexibility. In 
one nonverbal adaptation using a computer task (Fig. 1.2; Pope et al. 2015), participants 
are trained to select three shapes in sequence (Square 1, Square 2, Triangle). Once they 
are proficient at this learned strategy, they encounter probe trials in which the final 
shape is present from trial start. Participants can use this more efficient shortcut, but, 
similar to the water jar problem, the familiar three-step strategy can also be used. In this 
task, most humans once again stick with the learned strategy, whereas all monkey and 
ape species tested to date readily abandon the familiar strategy in favor of the shortcut 
(Pope et al. 2015, 2019; Watzek et al. 2019). These findings narrow down the possible 
mechanisms underlying cognitive set bias. The humans may have perceived the stimuli 
and the sequence globally, whereas the apes and monkeys perceived them locally 
(Fagot and Tomonaga 1999; Spinozzi et al. 2003; De Lillo et al. 2005). However, in a 
cross-cultural study testing the seminomadic Himba of Namibia with the same 
nonverbal paradigm, local and global processers within the same population did not 
differ in their shortcut use (Pope et al. 2018).  
The Himba used the shortcut more than the Westerners, however, suggesting 
that cultural influences may shape how people conceptualize a problem and how 
flexibly they try to solve it. For example, formal schooling in Western cultures may 
encourage blind repetition and build an expectation that each problem has a single 
correct solution (Star and Seifert 2006). Indeed, when Westerners were prompted to “try 
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something new,” they did just as well as the Himba (Pope et al. 2018; see also Luchins 
1942) and Western children used the shortcut more than Western adults (Pope et al. 
2015). Thus, differences in how people conceptualize the problem and in what they 
think they “should do” likely play a role, but this does not explain everything. More 
than half the adults from both cultures still failed to use the shortcut, whereas none of 
the baboons or chimpanzees kept using the familiar strategy. 
One possibility for why other primates use the more efficient shortcut more than 
humans is that it requires less working memory. If following the learned strategy is 
difficult, there is more benefit in seeking out a less effortful alternative (Beilock and 
DeCaro 2007). Thus, ironically, because the learned rule is easier for humans to learn (as 
indicated by the lower amount of training) and apply (as indicated by their higher 
accuracy), we might stick with it more even when a shortcut becomes available. In 
support of this point, other primates show somewhat more habitual strategy use (by 
starting with the first step in the sequence but taking the shortcut before completing the 
full sequence) among a primate species with reportedly high working memory capacity 
(Pope et al. 2019) and when the learned rule requires less working memory (Watzek et 
al. 2019). But having fewer cognitive constraints does not explain well why humans 
show such limited flexibility in this task. The ease with which humans learn and apply 
the learned strategy hints at yet another candidate explanation – because we can 
verbally encode the rule, we learn it quickly and it may become more firmly rooted. 
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This allows us to use the rule with high accuracy but may require more cognitive effort 
to switch to alternative strategies. Indeed, when humans did use the shortcut, they 
made more mistakes when they had to switch between strategies, whereas monkeys 
showed no such switch costs (Watzek et al. 2019). 
However, while the difference between humans and other primates is stark and 
robust, there are also differences within each population. Some humans did use the 
shortcut in all of these studies, some monkeys and apes used the switch strategy, and 
individuals varied in the extent to which they showed either of the possible strategies. 
What underlies these interindividual differences in habitual rule use and their 
willingness to explore alternative strategies is an open question. Further, children used 
the shortcut more than adults, suggesting that we sometimes become less, not more, 
rational with experience (see also Williamson et al. 2019). And when humans were 
given additional test trials, more participants eventually started using the shortcut 
(Watzek et al. 2019). These results highlight both that individual participants may not 
show the population’s average behavior and that a given participant’s behavior may 
not reflect how they behave at all times. Although this point is hardly world-shattering, 
we argue that comparative research should study this variability explicitly and develop 
theories about its roots rather than simply treat it as noise. 
This research on cognitive set bias provides a nice illustration of how 
comparative, developmental, and cross-cultural studies can triangulate the 
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psychological mechanisms that underlie decision-making biases – here in an area in 
which humans seem to be uniquely daft. We showed how testing different species can 
tell us more than studying humans alone, in the same way that testing children can tell 
us more than studying adults alone and testing people with a different cultural 
background can tell us more than studying Westerners alone (e.g., Nielsen and Haun 
2016). By comparing these different populations that vary in unique ways, e.g., in their 
perceptual processing, their cognitive abilities and constraints, their educational history 
and how they conceptualize problems, and their encoding modes, we can disentangle 
the role of these different factors in explaining our susceptibility to decision-making 
biases.  
 
Evolution of decision-making biases 
More than just eliminating or highlighting human-unique mechanisms that may 
underlie a given bias, the pattern of species that do or do not show it can tell us about 
its evolutionary history. Biases that are shared widely across the animal kingdom 
suggest that the proximate cause is evolutionarily ancient. Biases that are shared 
narrowly across one phylogenetic branch suggest a mechanism common to that group 
alone (e.g., primates only), and biases found sporadically across different branches 
suggest a stronger impact of species’ ecologies than shared evolutionary history.  
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To give an example of how this works, humans will routinely forgo or reject 
rewards if they are distributed unequally among people. Although cultures vary in 
their aversion to inequity (Henrich et al. 2001), this behavior is often seen as an 
indicator of the human sense of fairness. A wide array of animal taxa also respond 
negatively to unequal outcomes, although responding when one gets more than a 
partner is far less common, both within and among species, than responding when one 
gets less than the partner (for reviews, see Brosnan and de Waal 2014; Oberliessen and 
Kalenscher 2019). Interestingly, species that cooperate even outside of mating and 
kinship bonds typically exhibit inequity aversion, whereas related species that do not 
cooperate (or not as widely) typically do not. Phylogenetic relatedness alone cannot 
account for this pattern. One proposed explanation is that inequity aversion evolved to 
maintain equitable cooperative partnerships and to prevent exploitation in these species 
(Brosnan and de Waal 2014). Of course, there are likely both phylogenetic and 
ecological factors at play. For example, one form of inequity aversion – responding 
negatively to receiving more than another – has only been reported in any form in 
chimpanzees (Brosnan et al. 2010; Proctor et al. 2013), and is by no means ubiquitous 
(Jensen et al. 2007; Kaiser et al. 2012). Thus, cognitive processes that may only be shared 
with humans’ closest living relatives, such as perhaps greater levels of self-control or 
anticipatory abilities, may be required to object not just to getting less, but also to 
getting more than others. 
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An evolutionary perspective also highlights the importance of considering both 
the social and physical environments that decision rules have evolved in. A strategy can 
be adaptive in one context but maladaptive in another, and even closely related species 
might have social or feeding ecologies that present them with different selection 
pressures that may, in turn, give rise to different behavioral strategies to cope with 
them. For example, highly social corvid and lemur species, who may need specific 
cognitive abilities to navigate more complex social environments, show greater 
reasoning skills than closely related but less social species (Bond et al. 2003; MacLean et 
al. 2008).  
Differences in feeding ecology can result in similar patterns, for instance in the 
discounting behavior and risk preferences of primate species. Marmosets are willing to 
wait for a large reward longer than tamarins, but tamarins are willing to travel farther 
for it than marmosets (Stevens et al. 2005a, b). Although the two species are closely 
related, this difference in temporal versus spatial discounting makes sense given the 
marmosets’ reliance on gum and sap, which requires self-control (i.e., waiting for the 
sap to ooze from a cut in the tree), and the tamarins’ reliance on insects, which are 
ephemeral and require more travel. Similarly, among our two closest living relatives, 
bonobos, who rely on relatively consistent food sources, are more risk averse whereas 
chimpanzees, who feed on ephemeral and more highly contested food sources, are 
more risk prone (Heilbronner et al. 2008). 
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Such comparative research may further challenge assumptions of a scala naturae. 
Not only are humans not at “the top,” neither are primates, mammals in general, or, for 
that matter, anyone. For example, when presented with an ephemeral food source that 
goes away and a permanent one that is always available, cleaner fish optimize by eating 
the ephemeral first and then the permanent one, much like they service visiting client 
reef fish before resident fish in the wild (Bshary and Grutter 2002; Salwiczek et al. 2012). 
Primates, rats, and pigeons, however, fail to follow this strategy that yields twice as 
much food in this simple task (grey parrots succeed; for a detailed review, see Zentall 
2019), although highlighting cues relevant to primates leads to them demonstrating the 
same behavioral outcomes as the fish (Prétôt et al. 2016a, b). These results emphasize 
that animal decision-making needs to be evaluated against species’ natural 
environments. We need to discard the notion that some animals are generally smarter 
than others because we may not always test them in species-appropriate ways and 
because, ultimately, the best decision-makers are the ones who solve problems that they 
actually encounter. 
Even within a given species, the context therefore often matters (Rosati and 
Stevens 2009). For example, chimpanzees show endowment effects for food but not 
objects (toys; Brosnan et al. 2007), unless the objects are immediately useful to obtain 
food (Brosnan et al. 2012a), suggesting that the tendency to overvalue objects in one’s 
possession may have evolved for salient items, like food, that have significant effects on 
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fitness. Indeed, in the absence of formalized rules for trade, exchanges are risky, and 
thus a bird in the hand may well be worth two in the bush. That is, you should value 
important items that you already have more than those you might get – but might not! 
Moreover, this tendency may generalize to situations when the risk from exchanges is 
minimized or removed, as in these experimental tasks. Similarly, organisms may 
change their risk preferences based on their energetic state, taking on more risks to 
avoid starvation even if it theoretically pays less in the long run (e.g., Caraco 1981; 
Dener et al. 2016). Such results can highlight contexts in which irrational behavior might 
be adaptive and therefore how it may have evolved. Humans, too, may be particularly 
tuned into specific problems we encounter in everyday life, such as social interactions. 
For example, people have a hard time with a classic logic puzzle when it is presented in 
abstract terms but tend to solve it when it is presented as a social exchange (Cosmides 
and Tooby 1992). 
Importantly, when we consider the environments in which decision rules have 
evolved, seemingly irrational behavior may not look so bad after all. In addition, 
situations in which we violate economic principles of rationality in the laboratory might 
happen only rarely in the real world. Nonsocial birds do not need to reason about 
transitive dominance hierarchies and tamarins do not need self-control to wait for sap 
to exude. If our irrational tendencies rarely lead to errors and are of little consequence 
when they do, then they cost us very little. But then why follow strategies that are 
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sometimes irrational at all? In some cases, a short-term loss might yield a long-term 
gain, e.g., if forgoing an unequal reward now results in a more equitable cooperative 
partnership overall. In other cases, we benefit from following rules of thumb because 
they save us the time and effort that would be required to always find optimal 
solutions, especially if there is little to gain from doing so (e.g., Watzek and Brosnan 
2018). Such heuristics are useful because our brains’ computational power is limited, 
and if these heuristics fit our environment well enough, they lead to good decision-
making most of the time. Thus, decision-making strategies that seem economically 
irrational may make more sense in the context of our cognitive constraints (bounded 
rationality: e.g., Camerer 1998; Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer and Goldstein 
1996; Gigerenzer and Selten 2001; Gigerenzer and Todd 1999) and features of our 
internal and external environments (ecological or biological rationality: e.g., Kacelnik 
2006; Stevens 2012; The Modelling Animal Decisions Group et al. 2014; De Petrillo and 
Rosati 2019). 
 
Challenges for Studies of Animal Decision-making Biases 
The importance of truly comparative methodologies 
Although studying decision-making biases in other animals offers unique insights, 
comparative studies also present unique problems. If we want to draw valid inferences 
by comparing different species (or different populations within a species), we need 
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valid comparisons. Otherwise, it is unclear whether mixed results within the same 
species reflect a failure to replicate or simply differences in methodologies (Tomasello 
and Call 2011; Smith et al. 2018). For example, comparative studies of the peak-end 
effect – the tendency to overvalue sequences with higher peak values and more positive 
events at the end – in rhesus macaques find opposite results. Three macaques 
consistently preferred to receive a higher valued food first and a lower valued food last 
(contrary to the peak-end effect) in a manual task (Xu et al. 2011), but three macaques 
from a different laboratory did prefer to “save the best for last” in a computer task in 
which they chose sequences of juice servings (Blanchard et al. 2014).  
There are many methodological differences between the two studies that may 
have affected the monkeys’ responses. The manual task involved fewer trials (30 test 
trials per session) than the computer task (thousands of training and test trials), used 
sequences of two rewards that differed in quality (e.g., a grape and half a green bean) 
rather than quantity, and were much larger than the sequences of five juice rewards 
(identical, but ranged in quantity from 0.08 to just 0.2 ml for the entire sequence). In 
addition, the time between items in the manual sequence was longer (several seconds) 
than in the computer task (always half a second). And while both tasks used two-choice 
paradigms, the manual task had monkeys choose between a decreasing and an 
increasing order for the same rewards, which also remained the same throughout 
testing. The computer task gave monkeys a probe sequence and had them choose 
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whether to repeat it or receive one of several pre-trained comparator sequences, and 
both sequences varied across trials. Consequently, some possibilities for why the peak-
end effect emerged in the computer but not in the manual task are that it might develop 
through repeated experience, only arises when rewards are small or vary in quantity 
but not quality, only arises when sequences are almost continuous rather than discrete, 
or perhaps only comes into effect when limited working memory or other cognitive 
constraints require the use of a shortcut (for example when comparing sequences of five 
rewards each that differ only by small amounts). Further, it is not clear how robust 
these findings are, given that both studies only tested three monkeys (and they did not 
always show consistent behavior in the manual task, Xu et al., 2011; though there was 
no statistical effect of monkey identity in the computer task on overall performance, 
Blanchard et al., 2014). 
A study on capuchin monkeys’ susceptibility to the peak-end effect (Egan Brad et 
al. 2016) helps to disentangle these possibilities. In each trial of a manual task, capuchin 
monkeys chose to trade tokens in exchange for biscuit sticks that were partly covered in 
frosting (i.e., sections that were preferable to biscuit alone). The biscuit sticks were fed 
through a little hole, resulting in continuous eating episodes for the monkeys. Other 
aspects of the procedure similar to Xu and colleagues’ manual task (e.g., fairly low trial 
numbers, large and qualitatively different rewards, rewards remained the same across 
trials). Two of four capuchins preferred to trade with the experimenter who fed them 
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the frosted end last rather than first (in line with the peak-end effect). These results 
suggest that, in monkeys, the peak-end bias may only affect evaluations of near-
continuous sequences of events. However, because each of the three studies used vastly 
different methods, direct comparisons are limited and future research is needed to 
determine the extent to which these results generalize. 
Even within the same individuals, housing conditions or small adjustments, such 
as in the length of an inter-trial interval, can make a bias “disappear.” Species as 
distantly related as pigeons, dogs, monkeys, and apes all prefer a high value food by 
itself to the same food and a low value food, e.g., choosing “cheese alone” over “cheese 
plus carrot” (for a review, see Zentall 2019). However, this less-is-more or selective-
value effect disappears when pigeons in the same laboratory were deprived of food 
(Zentall et al. 2014) or when the same chimpanzees had longer intervals between trials 
(Beran et al. 2009b), indicating that experimental factors affect choice behavior through 
food motivation and expectations about what food will be available in the future. 
Of course, these issues make comparisons of decision-making biases between 
species especially problematic. This effect is compounded if the task itself must be 
adjusted to take into account differences between the species (e.g., monkeys can 
indicate a choice by grabbing objects with their hands, but birds might use their beaks, 
and spiders may choose where to walk their entire bodies, the latter of which 
functionally disallows attempts to get both objects at once, which may affect bimanual 
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species’ choices) or if the comparison is between humans and any other species (see 
below). If two species are tested on different paradigms and one species shows the 
effect but another does not, it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether this indicates 
true species differences. Was the task easier for one species due to innate differences in 
how they interacted with it? Was the adapted task easier, perhaps by providing more 
cues or additional pretraining? Did the humans get verbal instruction or was the task 
oversimplified for the other species in an effort to make it comprehensible? Similarly, if 
both species show the effect or both do not, it is unclear whether the difference in 
methodology masks species differences that are actually there. If these challenges sound 
familiar, they are the same ones faced by developmental scientists adapting their tasks 
for younger and younger children or cross-cultural researchers making sure that their 
tasks are interpreted in the same ways across many diverse perspectives. It may be even 
harder for comparative scientists (and infant researchers), however, because we cannot 
even ask the animals what they thought we were doing as a validation. 
For example, some studies have found decoy effects in animals – a shift in the 
preferences between two options simply by adding a third, non-viable option – but 
findings and methodologies are extremely mixed. Bees show decoy effects when 
foraging from artificial flowers that vary in the effort they require, gray jays do so when 
foraging from feeding tubes with varying predation risks (Shafir et al. 2002), and rhesus 
macaques do when discriminating rectangles that differ in size and orientation (Parrish 
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et al. 2015). However, the same rhesus macaques are unaffected by decoy options when 
choosing between tasks that vary in effort (Parrish et al. 2018) and two other primate 
studies do not find decoy effects in capuchins (Cohen and Santos 2016) or four great ape 
species tested with different food choice tasks (Sánchez-Amaro et al. 2019). Given these 
differences in paradigms, it is difficult to say what is signal and what is noise, making 
comparisons – and the conclusions we can draw from them – extremely limited. 
Comparative researchers need to be particularly aware of this problem when 
adapting designs from human decision-making studies for use with animals. Whereas 
humans can provide one-shot decisions after verbal instructions, animals typically 
complete trials offering the same choice repeatedly and after sometimes extensive 
training. If animals show the phenomenon, is it equivalent to the humans’ behavior? 
One way to explore this is to repeat the animal version of the task with human 
participants. For example, capuchin monkeys’ risk preferences change depending on 
whether options are framed as gains or losses in a nonverbal paradigm 
(Lakshminarayanan et al. 2011). Though seemingly similar to the classic human 
findings (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), humans do not show this framing effect when 
tested with a similar procedure to the monkeys (Silberberg et al. 2013). Of course, this 
could also be because the tasks used with other species are simplistic and artificial, 
making them challenging to use with humans, who may not be motivated to do well in 
them. On the other hand, if animals do not show the phenomenon, does that absence 
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indicate a true species difference or would humans also behave differently if tested with 
the animal paradigm? For example, chimpanzees, unlike humans, acted in a rational, 
self-interested way in a nonverbal version of the Ultimatum Game often used to assess 
fairness (Jensen et al. 2007; see also Kaiser et al. 2012). But when humans are tested in a 
similar paradigm, they maximize, too (Smith and Silberberg 2010). If we want to draw 
strong conclusions from comparative research, we need to test different species – 
humans included – using the same or equivalent procedures (although doing so comes 
with its own difficulties; see also Smith et al. 2018). 
Even within the same species or the very same study population, researchers 
may vary seemingly small factors for practical reasons. For example, different animals 
may reasonably work for different food rewards because they show different 
preferences. Even if the same foods are used for all animals, different animals will value 
them differently. Although animals may show similar preferences (e.g., as indicated by 
the percentage chosen in two-choice trials), the difference in value between options may 
be quite different (Casey et al. 2013; Schwartz et al. 2016). Of course, this point is 
especially important when the difference in reward value can affect the behavior of 
interest (e.g., Beran et al. 2009a; Xu et al. 2011). In general, comparative researchers need 
to carefully consider whether the choices that animals make actually reveal their 
underlying preferences or may instead, for example, result from a lack of inhibition. 
Primates may “prefer” choosing less over more in the ephemeral reward task not 
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because they actually prefer receiving less but because they are unable to inhibit the 
prepotent response of reaching for a visible food item or because they are averse to the 
option that sometimes disappears (Prétôt et al. 2016b). Conversely, capuchin monkeys 
choose to wait for a “larger, later” reward rather than obtain a “smaller, sooner” one in 
an intertemporal choice task, but may not actually be able to maintain the longer delay, 
suggesting that this does not truly reflect a choice to wait (Paglieri et al. 2013). Such 
seemingly minor changes to methodology can affect animals’ choices and lead us to 
conclude that a given decision-making bias is present when it is not or that it is not 
present when it actually is, which can further complicate comparisons across species. 
 
The importance of inter- and intra-individual variability 
Of course, carefully designing our studies with comparable methodologies is necessary 
but not sufficient if we want reliable, let alone valid results. Comparative research is 
notorious for small sample sizes and a limited range of species, and this presents a 
major obstacle to the comparative study of decision-making biases as well. For example, 
a recent review of primate cognition research published between 2014 and 2019 found 
that the median sample size across studies and species was 7 individuals and that fewer 
than 15% of primate species had been studied, which limits the generalizability of the 
results (ManyPrimates et al. 2019). One of the reasons why small samples are 
problematic is because they reduce our power to detect effects that really exist. If a 
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species does not show a given bias or if a replication attempt fails, we do not know 
whether it is truly not present or whether we simply failed to detect it. Combined with 
the file-drawer problem – if null results are less likely to be published than statistically 
significant results – this can distort the literature and stifle scientific progress.  
Oftentimes, we might find null results when there is a lot of individual 
variability relative to the effect (e.g., a change in mean preference, averaged over 
individuals). This pattern can make it hard to detect group-level effects and to 
generalize from the sample to the population. But this variability can be informative, 
and we lose a lot by averaging over individuals (and sometimes over species). Indeed, 
for certain effects we should even predict individuals to vary substantially, e.g. for 
biases that are hypothesized to rely on limited working memory ability or that vary 
with personality or with an individual’s social relationships or their standing in the 
group. Rather than focusing just on whether a given bias is absent or present on a 
species level, we should strive to assess the extent to which it is, because individuals 
may vary in the strength of the effect or some individuals may be susceptible whereas 
others are not. For example, animals from a variety of species have shown negative 
responses to inequity (Brosnan and de Waal 2014; Oberliessen and Kalenscher 2019), 
including chimpanzees. However, in no study to date has this been the case for every 
single chimpanzee, and factors such as personality and the length of the relationship 
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between partners have been suggested to affect the inequity response (Brosnan et al. 
2005, 2010, 2015; Bräuer et al. 2006).  
Assessing biases on a continuum rather than on a binary also opens up 
opportunities to further understand the underlying mechanisms and to assess the effect 
of different methodologies. For example, whether animals with a certain rank, sex, age, 
or cognitive skill are more susceptible to a bias helps us tease apart the effect of 
cognitive constraints, social relationships, and hormonal factors. This is particularly 
true in situations in which an individual’s outcomes depend on what others do, e.g., in 
tests of cooperation or competition (see, e.g., Watzek et al. 2018). For example, if 
experimental tests of cooperation in the laboratory rely solely on pairs of animals who 
are, at a minimum, willing to be in proximity of each other, they likely result in a 
distorted picture of cooperative behavior because we know that it varies depending on 
who the partner is and how many animals are involved (e.g., in chimpanzees: Melis et 
al. 2006a, b; Suchak et al. 2014, 2017). Similarly, if those animals who show an effect in 
one paradigm also do so in another, then we can be more confident that both paradigms 
tap into the same underlying concept. Ideally, we can even extend this approach to 
testing whether different decision-making biases tend to co-occur, to assess the extent to 
which individual factors play a role. 
Another source of variation that is often masked by averaging comes from 
changes over time, e.g., over the course of trials or sessions. This can be problematic 
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because decision-making strategies can change also over time, e.g., due to learning 
effects, order effects, or satiation effects as an animal’s energetic state changes with 
rewards from earlier trials. For example, primates’ previous choices can affect their 
valuation of current options (Egan et al. 2007, 2010; West et al. 2010), and food 
deprivation might lead animals to make more rational, reward maximizing choices 
(Zentall et al. 2014) or to take risks they prefer to avoid when satiated (Caraco 1981). 
Therefore, the assumption that animals’ choices in repeated trials are independent may 
rarely hold true, and we need to systematically assess changes over time. Finally, to our 
knowledge there are no studies of decision-making biases that assess the stability of 
these effects over longer time periods. Such studies may be more feasible when working 
with animals in the laboratory because the same animals can be tested repeatedly.  
 
Future Directions for Studies of Animal Decision-making Biases 
Comparative research into how animals make good or bad decisions promises unique 
insights into our own behavior. By assessing how a phenomenon is distributed across 
multiple species that vary in their cognitive abilities, constraints, and experiences, we 
can constrain our hypotheses for the psychological processes that give rise to it. For 
example, sunk cost effects can clearly arise in the absence of formal economic markets 
or arguably human-unique tendencies such as waste avoidance, and may rely on more 
wide-spread cognitive mechanisms. On the other hand, cognitive set bias may be 
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unique to humans and arise from verbal encoding, greater working memory 
availability, and cultural or educational expectations about how to solve problems.  
Further, the patterns in how closely or distantly related the species that share a 
given effect are can reveal at which points in the phylogenetic tree it evolved. Knowing 
to what extent behaviors are homologous or convergent, in turn, lets us generate 
hypotheses about why they may have evolved. Do these decision strategies solve a 
problem that is commonly encountered in these species’ environments? Inequity 
aversion, for instance, may lead to a short-term loss but ensure better cooperation in the 
long run. Or are biases simply by-products of otherwise adaptive strategies that fail in 
certain circumstances? If so, how often do animals actually encounter situations in 
which such irrational behavior would emerge and how costly is it? Studying decision-
making biases in species other than our own lets us answer these questions. 
Importantly, this research can yield insights and new testable predictions that can help 
better explain human behavior as well. For example, the findings that the strength of 
endowment effects may vary with the evolutionary salience of the object, and that sunk 
cost effects may not accrue while weighing whether to invest but only for ongoing 
investments arose from comparative research but have implications for human 
decision-making. 
However, in order to draw valid evolutionary inferences from cross-species 
comparisons, we need a reliable and valid body of empirical work. Methodological 
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differences both within and across species, small sample sizes, and limited diversity in 
the kinds of species that have been tested are major challenges to the comparative study 
of decision-making biases. If we are not sure whether a given bias is present or not in a 
specific species, let alone whether the “same” bias was assessed in another species, any 
inferences that rely on how the phenomenon is distributed across species are severely 
limited. To complicate this issue, by simply assessing presence or absence, we may miss 
out on important variability in how strongly an effect manifests and whether it is 
affected by changes over time (e.g., learning through experience) or reliably predicted 
by individual differences. 
Of course, no single researcher can address all of these issues and gaps in the 
comparative study of decision-making biases, but neither can they only be solved by 
top-down changes to the field at large. Practices that individual researchers can adopt 
range from minimal changes to current procedures to literal and figurative paradigm 
shifts. Of course, some of these measures will not be possible in every case, e.g., for 
practical or ethical reasons. Nonetheless, here we list some ideas that individual 
researcher can adopt themselves in their role as study authors or can encourage others 
to adopt in their role as reviewers and editors: 
1. Conducting direct replications of previous studies in the same species. 
 
2. Testing other populations and study species with the same paradigm used 
with other species in previous studies. 
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3. Testing the same study population with several paradigms for the same 
concept. 
 
4. Collaborating with others to increase sample sizes and ensure direct 
comparability. 
 
5. Reporting data for individuals and considering potential sources of 
variability. If possible, sharing raw data on a more detailed level to improve 
peer review and allow for secondary analyses.  
 
6. Reporting the extent of biases as dependent variables and design 
experimental measures to capture a continuum rather than a binary. 
 
7. Publishing results regardless of outcome. Preregistrations and article formats 
such as registered reports are two recent developments that can help in 
combatting the file-drawer problem from the researcher side. Of course, 
increased willingness to recommend and accept “negative” or mixed results 
by journals is necessary on the reviewer and publisher side. 
 
We believe that the field stands to benefit immensely if comparative researchers 
adopt even just some of these practices. Doing so helps us build a robust body of 
scientific literature on both good and bad decision-making in animals. This allows us to 
more deeply understand how, when, and why we make these decisions than we could 
by studying humans alone, revealing the cognitive processes and evolutionary forces 
that give rise to irrational behavior. Combined with insights from developmental and 
cross-cultural perspectives, such an understanding is crucial to disentangling the factors 
that influence our own behavior, which, ultimately, will help us make better decisions. 
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Abstract 
Theories of optimal decision-making typically assume that animals have consistent 
preferences among options. In reality, economic behaviour in humans and foraging 
behaviour in some animals is often susceptible to choice-irrelevant factors such as 
inferior options or conspecifics’ outcomes, but the evidence for primate decision-
making is mixed. Unlike previous experiments, we assessed the relative magnitude of 
three context effects. Using a food preference paradigm, we varied the number of cereal 
pieces to determine how much a piece of food A was “worth” (50% choice) to each of 13 
capuchins. We predicted that monkeys would devalue A in the contrast condition 
(when a higher-quality but unattainable food was present) and overvalue it in the decoy 
condition (when a smaller version of A was a third option) and social condition (when 
A, if unchosen, was given to a partner). Capuchins were 4 times less likely to choose A 
in the contrast condition, but 2 to 3 times more likely to choose it in the decoy and social 
conditions. When carefully accounting for initial preferences, we found that these 
primates, like humans, are sensitive to context effects. This suggests that these biases 
are evolved and impacts how we think about them in humans. 
Keywords: decision-making bias, context dependence, decoy effect, contrast effect, 
capuchin monkey, Sapajus [Cebus] apella 
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Introduction 
Animals from a wide array of taxa change their preference depending on the context, 
such as what other options or social partners are present, how or in which sequence 
options are presented, what choices they previously made, or their current energetic 
state [for example, see 1,2]. Such aspects should be irrelevant if animals form stable 
preferences and use them to make consistent decisions, but responding to these factors 
can make more sense when viewed in the context of an individual’s environment, 
which has been hypothesized to shift preferences in consistent ways [3–6]. For example, 
to be a successful member of the group, social animals should consider the effect of their 
actions on their relationships with others and modify their behaviour accordingly. If an 
animal is on the brink of starvation, it should take on more risk than it usually would. In 
the real world, making decisions contingent on these factors often makes sense, and 
indeed, our brains seem wired to do so [7–9]. Further, if an individual has limited 
cognitive resources, it seems reasonable to follow easier strategies if they work well 
most of the time, even if they fail in some situations [10–12]. However, comparative 
studies of context-dependent choice to date have typically emphasised only whether or 
not a given effect is present, but not to what extent it is or how its magnitude compares 
to other context effects. In this study, we quantified the relative importance of two non-
social (decoy and contrast) and one social context effect on reward valuation in 
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capuchin monkeys, who have shown human-like decision-making biases in some 
contexts [2,13–17] though not others [18–23].  
The decoy effect – in which one option increases in value when an inferior one is 
added – has been found in some animal species but not others, but these studies have 
used vastly different methodologies, making it difficult to compare across studies, 
much less species. This limits the evolutionary inferences we can draw. For example, 
bees and grey jays show decoy effects when choosing among artificial flowers and tubes 
holding raisins, respectively [24]. But in primates, the only study that has found a decoy 
effect used a perceptual discrimination task [25], but the same monkeys do not show the 
effect when choosing among tasks that vary in effort required [26]. Further, two studies 
using food choice tasks, which are arguably most similar to the foraging experiments 
used with bees and grey jays, found no evidence of this bias [19,27]. One possibility for 
these results is that the primates’ preferences between the initial options were too 
strong for the decoys to change their behavioural choices, even though they might have 
changed the perceived value of the options. For example, if you typically prefer a grape 
80% of the time over a piece of banana, then the presence of a smaller grape might raise 
the value of the whole grape, but not enough to actually choose it statistically 
significantly more often, especially if they easily substitute for each other [28,29]. Here 
we test the possibility that primates’ decoy effects in food choice experiments depends 
on the strength of their initial preference by assessing preference changes relative to 
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both low and high baseline comparisons. Critically, we established baselines specific to 
each monkey to better compare shifts in preferences across individuals. 
Contrasting the inconsistent evidence surrounding decoy effects, evidence for 
contrast effects – in which an option decreases in value when a superior one is present, 
but unattainable – is quite consistent. Indeed, operant conditioning relies on animals’ 
expectations for specific outcomes (such as rewards) after specific actions and changing 
their behaviour if that outcome changes (i.e., learning) [30,31]. Presenting a reward 
presumably prompts an expectation to receive it and violating this expectation can 
result in a negative emotional response. Simply put, the animal may get frustrated 
[30,32–35]. Such frustration effects have been proposed to play a role in why animals 
may respond negatively to inequity, that is, when they receive less than a partner for 
the same work [15,36].  
Here we used an identical paradigm to quantify and compare the extent to which 
these three context effects change how a food item is valued. We used a food preference 
paradigm typical for both decoy and contrast effects, although our social condition 
differs from typical studies on inequity aversion. Typically, the partner receives a food 
item that is assigned by the experimenter and is independent of what the participant 
does, whereas in our paradigm, whether the partner received a food item was explicitly 
linked to the participant’s choice. We predicted that the monkeys would devalue a food 
item (e.g., a piece of apple) if there was a better, though unattainable option present 
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(contrast condition), and overvalue the food if there was a worse option present (decoy 
condition) or when the food went to a social partner if the participant did not choose it 
(social condition). For a rational decision-maker, of course, there should be no 
differences between these conditions, as they should be unaffected by these choice-
irrelevant factors. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
We tested 13 capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella, 10 female, 3 male, age MSD = 
15.315.57, range: 7-23 years). These capuchins are socially housed in three mixed-sex 
groups, each with their own indoor/outdoor enclosures with a variety of climbing 
structures, visual barriers, and regularly provided enrichment devices. Capuchins 
routinely separate voluntarily into testing boxes attached to their enclosures for 
cognitive and behavioural studies. They were never required to come in for testing and 
could choose not to participate at any time without consequences. Monkeys always had 
access to water, including during testing, and were never food deprived (except for 
medical reasons unrelated to research studies). All testing food was given in addition to 
their daily diet of vegetables, fruit, and primate chow. 
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Procedure 
We administered a series of food preference tests to determine how much a specific 
food item was valued in units of another food. We considered indifference (50% choice) 
between two options to indicate equivalence. Each trial began by placing two or three 
food items (depending on the condition, see below) on a board out of the monkey’s 
reach. The board was pushed within the monkey’s reach and the monkey made a choice 
by reaching for one of the available options. The experimenter covered the unchosen 
options with her hands and removed them while the monkey ate the food. The next trial 
began immediately. Options were counterbalanced so that they appeared in each of the 
locations on the board in an equal number of trials, but no more than twice in a row in 
the same location. Each session took place on a different day.  
Test conditions 
For each monkey separately, we identified food items A and B such that they reliably 
preferred food A over ½ a cereal piece and a smaller version of itself (decoy food A), 
but also reliably preferred 5 cereal pieces and contrast food B over food A (see ESM and 
Table S2.1). 
Monkeys completed 6 sessions with 18 trials for the baseline condition. Monkeys 
then completed 2 sessions with 18 trials each of the decoy, contrast, and social 
conditions (Fig. 2.1) in a randomly assigned order. 
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Figure 2.1 Test setup and test conditions. During test conditions, monkeys always 
chose between food A and ½ to 5 pieces of cereal (baseline). In the decoy condition, a 
smaller piece of food A was available as a third option. In the contrast condition, a 
better food item was present, but out of reach. In the social condition, a partner monkey 
(sitting in an adjacent test box) received food A if the participant monkey did not 
choose it. 
 
In the baseline condition, monkeys chose between food A and X cereal. The 
number of cereal pieces, X, was the same within a session but varied across sessions. 
Monkeys completed one session each for X equal to ½, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 pieces of cereal in 
a random order. We then used this preference data to determine two “medium” 
amounts of cereal for each monkey (Table S3.1). Amount L (lower bound) was the 
largest number of cereal that the monkey chose less than 50% of the time compared to 
food A. Amount U (upper bound) was the smallest number of cereal pieces that the 
monkey chose more than 50% of the time compared to food B (Fig. S2.1). 
The decoy condition was identical to the baseline condition except that the decoy 
food A was available as an option in addition to food A and X cereal (Fig. 2.1). Monkeys 
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completed one session each for X equal to L and U in a random order (e.g., food A vs. 2 
cereal and food A vs. 3 cereal). 
The contrast condition was identical to the baseline condition except that the 
contrast food B was present in addition to the two food options (food A and X cereal). 
The contrast food was located in the middle of the board but remained out of the 
monkey’s reach throughout the trial (Fig. 2.1). Monkeys completed one session each for 
X equal to L and U in a random order. 
The social condition was identical to the baseline condition with one exception. If 
the monkey chose the cereal pieces, then food A was given to the partner monkey in a 
neighbouring test box (Fig. 2.1). If the participant monkey chose food A, the partner did 
not receive any food (see Table S2.1 for partner assignments). Monkeys completed one 
session each for X equal to L and U in a random order. 
 
Results 
To compare the effect of the different non-social and social contexts on monkeys’ 
valuations of the food at the group level, we fit a mixed effects logistic regression model 
with choice as the binomial outcome variable. We included individual identity as a 
random effect to account for individual variability in baseline food preferences. We 
found a significant interaction effect of condition and number of cheerios on capuchin 
monkeys’ food preferences (Fig. 2.2), 2(3)= 26.984, p<.001.  
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Figure 2.2. Food preference by condition and number of cheerios. Percentage of trials 
in which each capuchin monkey chose food A over L cheerios (left panel) or U cheerios 
(right panel). Horizontal lines indicate estimated marginal means. 
 
Capuchins’ choices for food A over L cheerios became 3.9 times less likely in the 
contrast condition (odds ratio [OR]=1/3.9, SE=0.06, p<.001), but did not change 
significantly in the decoy and social conditions compared to baseline (ps>.05). 
Conversely, capuchins’ choices for food A over U cheerios became twice as likely in the 
decoy condition1 (OR=2.04, SE=0.44, p=.003) and 2.8 times more likely in the social 
condition (OR=2.76, SE=0.60, p=.003), but did not change significantly in the contrast 
condition compared to baseline (ps>.05).  
 
 
1 Decoy food A, intended as a non-viable option, was indeed chosen in only 2% of trials. 
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Discussion 
Capuchin monkeys showed all three context effects in the predicted direction. They 
devalued a food item when a higher-quality but unattainable option was present 
(contrast effect) but overvalued it when an inferior option was available (decoy effect) 
or when it was given to a partner if the monkey did not choose it (social context effect).  
These results held across different food items but depended on monkeys’ initial 
preferences. Only relatively strong preferences for the target food were susceptible to 
being suppressed by contrast. Conversely, only relatively low preferences were 
susceptible to being boosted by the decoy or partner outcomes. This dependence on 
baseline preferences may, in part, explain why previous studies using food preference 
paradigms with primates [19,27] have found mixed results, because they used the same 
food items and quantities for each individual. In this study, we carefully calibrated 
monkeys’ initial preferences 1) by changing the food items and sizes and 2) by using a 
countable food item that does not easily substitute for fruit and vegetable pieces. The 
latter is important because food preferences may not only reflect differences in value 
but also the degree of substitutability [28,29], because, for example, one type of nut can 
replace another but neither can replace water.  
To our knowledge, this study is also the first to directly compare the magnitude 
of different context effects using the same paradigm to assess them. The contrast 
condition had almost twice as big of an effect as the decoy and social conditions, 
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suggesting that devaluing food items in the presence of better ones potentially has a 
higher impact on fitness. Interestingly, capuchin monkeys’ responses to the decoy and 
social conditions were similar. Note that in the social condition with relatively few 
cereal pieces (amount L), capuchins did not experience the social outcome (the partner 
receiving food A) very often because they typically chose food A themselves. However, 
preferences for food A were also predicted to increase, suggesting a possible ceiling 
effect. The fact that our paradigm can detect such sensitivity opens up exciting 
possibilities for future comparative research to systematically assess how differences in 
species’ feeding and social ecologies may shape their relative susceptibility to different 
biases. 
In this study, we found that capuchin monkeys, like humans, are susceptible to a 
range of context effects. These results support the hypothesis that these decision-
making biases are evolved and has implications for how we address them in humans. 
Our paradigm allows researchers to test a wide range of taxa and to directly compare 
the magnitude, rather than just the presence or absence, of these effects. In particular, 
studying which aspects of animals’ physical and social environments may have shaped 
the evolution of these biases lets us better understand why we show them and, 
ultimately, helps us make better decisions.  
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Electronic Supplementary Material 
Pretest conditions 
During pretest 1 sessions, monkeys completed 9 trials each for two comparisons 
presented in random order: food A vs. ½ a cereal piece and food A vs. 5 cereal. 
Monkeys advanced to pretest 2 when they completed two consecutive sessions in which 
they chose food A over ½ cereal in 7 out of 9 trials and chose 5 cereal over food A in 7 
out of 9 trials (i.e., 14 out of 18 total trials per comparison, a statistically significant 
preference in a binomial test).  
During pretest 2 sessions, monkeys completed 9 trials each for two comparisons 
presented in random order: food A vs. decoy food A and food A vs. contrast food B. 
Decoy food items were smaller versions of food A. Contrast food items were a 
qualitatively different food item, but identical in size to food A. For example, if food A 
was a 1g piece of apple, decoy food A was a 0.5g piece of apple, and contrast food B 
was a 1g piece of grape. Monkeys advanced to testing when they completed two 
consecutive sessions in which they chose food A over decoy food A in 7 out of 9 trials 
and chose contrast food B over food A in 7 out of 9 trials. 
 We changed the food items and their sizes to find a suitable combination 
for each monkey (Table S2.1). 
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Table S2.1. Partner assignments and test foods. * indicates males. In the pretest 
conditions, we identified food items for each monkey such that food A was reliably 
preferred over ½ cereal and a smaller version of itself (decoy food A), but such that 5 
cereal and contrast food B were reliably preferred over food A. In the baseline 
condition, we identified two “medium” cereal amounts that the monkey preferred just 
less than (amount L) or just more than (amount U) food A (see main text and Fig. S2.1). 
Group Monkey Partner Food A Decoy Food A Food B L U 
1 Logan* Ingrid Cucumber 1.5g Cucumber 0.75g Apple 1.5g 1 2 
1 Ira Irene Cucumber 2g Cucumber 1g Apple 2g 0.5 1 
1 Paddy Ira Cucumber 1g Cucumber 0.5g Apple 1g 2 3 
1 Irene Ingrid Cucumber 2.5g Cucumber 1.25g Apple 2.5g 2 3 
1 Ingrid Ira Apple 1g Apple 0.5g Grape 1g 1 2 
2a Griffin* Wren Apple 1g Apple 0.5g Grape 1g 2 3 
2a Lily Griffin* Cucumber 1g Cucumber 0.5g Apple 1g 0.5 1 
2a Wren Lily Cucumber 2g Cucumber 0.5g Apple 2g 0.5 1 
2a Widget Wren Cucumber 2.5g Cucumber 1.25g Apple 2.5g 0.5 1 
2b Nkima* Gambit Apple 1g Apple 0.5g Grape 1g 1 2 
2b Nala Nkima* Apple 1g Apple 0.5g Grape 1g 0.5 1 
2b Gambit Lychee Apple 1.2g Apple 0.6g Grape 1.2g 1 2 
2b Lychee Nkima* Apple 2g Apple 1g Grape 2g 2 3 
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Figure S2.1. Example of a monkey’s preference data in the baseline condition. Solid 
line indicates logistic curve fit. Amounts L and U indicate the lower and upper bound 
of how many pieces of cereal food A is “worth” (equivalent to). 
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Abstract 
Human decision-making is often swayed by irrecoverable investments even though it 
should only be based on future – and not past – costs and benefits. Although this sunk 
cost effect is widely documented and can lead to devastating losses, the underlying 
psychological mechanisms are unclear. To tease apart possible explanations through a 
comparative approach, we assessed capuchin and rhesus monkeys’ susceptibility to 
sunk costs in a psychomotor task. Monkeys needed to track a moving target with a 
joystick-controlled cursor for variable durations. They could stop at any time, ending 
the trial without reward. To minimize the work required for a reward, monkeys should 
have always persisted for at least 1 second, but should have abandoned the trial if that 
did not yield a reward. Capuchin monkeys and especially rhesus macaques persisted to 
trial completion even when it was suboptimal, and were more likely to complete the 
trial the longer they had already tracked the target. These effects were less pronounced, 
although still present, when the change in expected tracking duration was signalled 
visually. These results show that sunk cost effects can arise in the absence of human-
unique factors and may emerge, in part, because persisting can resolve uncertainty.  
Keywords: decision-making bias, sunk cost, rhesus macaque, capuchin monkey, 
Macaca mulatta, Sapajus [Cebus] apella 
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Introduction 
We routinely consider sunk costs (irrecoverable prior investments of e.g., money, time, 
or effort) when making decisions that should only be based on the future costs and 
benefits. For example, if your benefit from selling your car is bigger than from keeping 
it (e.g., due to lack of use or maintenance and repair costs), then you should sell it, 
regardless of what you initially paid for it. However, humans tend to persist in an 
endeavour the more resources we have already invested into it1,2. This susceptibility to 
sunk costs can lead to bad decision-making for individuals, organizations, and even 
societies as a whole, for example, if people spend time, money, and effort on doomed 
projects or policy initiatives. In one notable example, the Concorde airplane project 
wasted millions in funding even after decision-makers realised that it had become a 
“commercial disaster3;” in fact, this bias is sometimes called the Concorde fallacy. Here 
we assess capuchin monkeys’ and rhesus macaques’ susceptibility to sunk costs to 
better understand the mechanisms that underlie this phenomenon. 
Such a comparative approach is particularly useful in this case because there are 
several psychological explanations for why this effect may arise that we can 
discriminate among by examining other species’ choice patterns. For example, people 
may justify continued investments because they have publicly committed to doing so, 
because they rationalize their previous decisions as sound rather than mistaken, 
because they want to avoid being wasteful, because they are uncertain about their 
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prospects, or because they eschew a definite loss (if they sell lower than they bought) in 
case a small additional investment turns things around for a gain1,2,4–13. Disentangling 
which processes contribute to sunk cost effects empirically is difficult because multiple 
may play a role and because they make similar predictions – that people consider sunk 
costs when it is suboptimal to do so and that the effect increases with the size of the 
sunk cost (i.e., irrecoverable prior investment). 
Assessing susceptibility to sunk costs in species other than humans can help us 
narrow down the possible explanations because other animals differ in some of these 
psychological mechanisms. If the sunk cost effect relies on human-unique factors, such 
as self-rationalization or public commitment, we would not predict other animals to 
show the sunk cost effect. On the other hand, if widespread responses to uncertainty or 
resource scarcity underlie the sunk cost effect, we would expect other animals to also be 
susceptible to sunk costs. We can further disentangle possible explanations by 
systematically studying the effect in species that vary in the behaviour of interest. For 
example, only starlings and capuchin monkeys have shown human-like loss aversion 
under risk14,15, becoming more risk prone when options were framed as losses than 
when the same options were framed as gains. To the extent that loss aversion 
contributes to the sunk cost effect, we would expect it to emerge in these species, but 
not in others that do not respond to losses in this way (although this has not been 
widely studied in animals). Conversely, if susceptibility to sunk costs does not covary 
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with differences in how a proposed mechanism is expressed across species, this 
suggests that this mechanism does not contribute to the emergence of the sunk cost 
effect in these species or in humans. Such a comparative approach can be particularly 
insightful if several mechanisms may contribute to the sunk cost effect in humans, 
because understanding the pattern of responses lets us assess their relative 
contributions.  
Indeed, humans are not the only species that shows sunk costs effects16, 
suggesting that human-unique factors such as human language, culture, or formal 
economic markets are not required for this bias to arise. For example, in experiments in 
which pigeons and rats needed to complete a repetitive action (such as pecks or lever 
presses), both species showed sunk cost effects, persisting with the action even when it 
became optimal to abandon the reinforcement schedule by selecting an opt-out option 
that skipped to the next trial8,17–20 (but see ref. 21). However, this effect disappeared when 
uncertainty about the remaining investment (required pecks or lever presses) was 
removed by signalling, via colour change, that a specific number of actions had been 
completed8,17 or when persisting required many more responses to reward8,17,18,22. These 
results suggest that the sunk cost effect emerges, in part, when we are uncertain about 
when it becomes beneficial to opt out rather than to continue investing, especially if 
there is little cost to persisting. In a foraging task that required waiting (i.e., inaction 
rather than action), rats, mice, and humans also showed sunk costs effects, becoming 
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more likely to complete a trial (i.e., to continue waiting rather than to opt out) the 
longer they had already waited23. Here, however, information about the remaining 
investment was always signalled via sound, suggesting that uncertainty reduction does 
not explain susceptibility to sunk costs in all contexts.  
In this study, we tested capuchin and rhesus monkeys using a computer task to 
assess the sunk cost effect in nonhuman primates for the first time. These species make 
economically suboptimal choices similar to humans’ in some situations24,25 (e.g., framing 
effects26 and loss aversion14, endowment effects27, peak-end effects28,29 [but see ref. 30], 
sensitivity to counterfactual outcomes31–33). In other contexts, however, capuchin and 
rhesus monkeys are more likely than humans to abandon a learned strategy in favour of 
a more efficient one in others (e.g., switching to an optional shortcut34 or violating 
transitivity when it is optimal to do so34,35), suggesting that they may not be as 
susceptible to sunk costs as people are. Our psychomotor task required continued 
action to persist (similar, in some aspects, to the repetitive-action paradigms used with 
pigeons and rats8,17,18,21), but unlike previous work, it required a continuous action 
(maintaining pressure on a joystick to keep a cursor moving) rather than a discrete 
response (pecking or lever pressing). We implemented this change to encourage 
monkeys to perceive and assess the investment in its entirety and not potentially as a 
series of seemingly unconnected actions, only some of which were rewarded. 
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If monkeys are susceptible to sunk costs, we predicted that they would persist in 
tracking a target even when opting out was optimal, and that they would be more likely 
to persist the longer they had already persisted. Further, we explicitly tested the extent 
to which the sunk cost effect in primates may arise due to uncertainty about the 
required additional effort by signalling effort visually. Based on previous work in 
pigeons and rats, we expected monkeys to show smaller sunk cost effects in the 
signalled condition, when this uncertainty is removed, than in the unsignalled 
condition, when there is uncertainty. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
We tested 26 capuchin monkeys (18 female, 8 male, age: M  SD = 17.65  8.06, range: 7 
to ca. 45 years) and 7 rhesus macaques (all male, age: M  SD = 23.57  7.35, range: 16-37 
years) at the Language Research Center of Georgia State University. 
Capuchin monkeys were socially housed in mixed-sex groups, each with their 
own indoor/outdoor enclosures with a variety of climbing structures, visual barriers, 
and regularly provided enrichment devices (e.g., foraging boards and puzzle boxes). 
Capuchins had been trained to separate voluntarily into testing boxes attached to their 
indoor enclosures for cognitive and behavioural studies. They were never required to 
come into the test boxes for testing and they could choose not to participate at any time 
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without consequences. Rhesus macaques were individually housed with continuous 
auditory and visual access to other monkeys and, when possible, regular social periods 
with compatible partners. Their enclosures doubled as testing boxes, but they too could 
choose not to participate at any time without consequences.  
All monkeys had access to water at all times, including during testing, and were 
never food deprived (except for medical reasons unrelated to research studies). All 
testing food was given in addition to their daily diet of vegetables, fruit, and primate 
chow. 
Task 
Monkeys were tested on individual computer testing systems (for details, see ref. 36). In 
this study, they needed to track a moving target with a cursor that they controlled with 
a joystick. After maintaining contact with the target for a specified duration, monkeys 
received a reward. If monkeys lost contact with the target, they did not receive a reward 
and the next trial began immediately. 
All trials began with the target, a purple circle with a 150-pixel diameter, placed 
at a random location on an 800  600-pixel screen and a red cursor placed directly under 
the target at a distance of 85 pixels (Fig. 3.1). While the cursor was outside the target, the 
target only moved when the cursor moved and stopped moving when the cursor 
stopped moving. The target moved in a straight line, starting with a random direction. 
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When it reached the edge of the screen at a given angle, it reflected at the same angle, 
like a billiard ball bounces off a rail.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Schematic trial progression. Dotted line and arrow show an example 
trajectory of the target (not present on actual trials). The tracking duration started when 
the cursor entered the target and lasted 1, 5, or 7 seconds. If the target was tracked for 
the entire duration, the monkey was rewarded; if they lost contact with the target, the 
trial ended without reward. In the unsignalled condition, the background colour 
remained white throughout the trial. In the signalled condition (shown here), the 
background colour changed to light grey after 1 second and to dark grey after 5 seconds 
(if applicable). 
 
When the cursor entered the target, the target changed colour to white and now 
kept moving even when the cursor stopped. If the cursor lost contact, the trial ended 
without reward. If monkeys maintained the cursor within the target for a specified 
duration, they received positive auditory feedback (whoop) and a banana-flavoured food 
pellet. The next trial began immediately. Monkeys completed blocks of 24 trials. 
During training, monkeys learned to track the target for variable durations, 
including but not limited to the tracking durations used during testing. The tracking 
duration required to receive a reward was a randomly determined number between 0 
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and X seconds for each trial (drawn from a uniform distribution and rounded to 
milliseconds, i.e., three decimal places). The maximum tracking duration possible (X) 
increased as monkeys proceeded through training; monkeys automatically proceeded 
to next phase when they successfully earned the reward in at least 80% of trials in two 
separate trial blocks (Table 3.1).   
 
Table 3.1. Training phases. Maximum tracking duration required and monkeys’ 
training performance (number of blocks required to meet criterion and number of 
monkeys who did and did not meet the criterion) for each phase. 
Phase 
Maximum 
Duration 
Species 
Blocks to Meet Criterion 
Npassed Nfailed 
Mdn IQR Range 
1 1 s Capuchin 3 2-7 2-35 24 2 
2 3 s Capuchin 20 
10.5-
105.5 
3-204 20 4 
3 6 s Capuchin 71 35-219.25 3-292 16 4 
4 8 s Capuchin 21 15-51 2-100 13 3 
1 1 s Rhesus 2 2-2 2-19 7 0 
2 3 s Rhesus 2 2-2.75 2-11 6 1 
3 6 s Rhesus 2.5 2-8.25 2-36 6 0 
4 8 s Rhesus 5 2.25-11.5 2-20 6 0 
 
During testing, each block consisted of 12 baseline trials and 12 probe trials for all 
species. Baseline trials had a tracking duration of one second; probe trials had a tracking 
duration of either five (6 trials) or seven seconds (6 trials).  
At the beginning of each trial, the expected value for the tracking duration was 
3.5 seconds (1/2 chance of 1 s + 1/4 chance of 5 s + 1/4 chance of 7 s). The measure of 
interest was monkeys’ behaviour in probe trials after they had tracked the target for one 
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second. At this point, they could have realized that it was not a baseline trial and that 
the expected additional tracking duration had changed (Table 3.2). Monkeys would 
now need to track the target another four or six seconds to receive the reward. But if 
they stopped moving the cursor to let the target lose contact (“opting out”), a new trial 
would begin that required only one second of tracking in most trials (and 3.5 seconds 
on average). Thus, opting out was optimal if there had not been a reward after one 
second of tracking. However, if monkeys persisted and tracked the target for a total of 
five seconds, they either received the reward at that time (in a five-second trial) or 
should have persisted for another two seconds (in a seven-second trial), which was less 
additional tracking time than a new trial required on average (3.5 seconds). 
 
Table 3.2. Expectations for tracking durations. Expected values for additional tracking 
required to receive the reward depended on the duration already spent tracking and the 
likelihood for which trial duration was in effect. 
Duration spent 
tracking target 
Expected additional 
duration required 
Calculation 
0 s 3.5 s ½  1s + ¼  5s + ¼  7s 
1 s 5 s ½  4s + ½  6s 
5 s 2 s 2s 
 
In the unsignalled condition, the background colour remained white throughout 
the trial. In the signalled condition, the background colour changed when the expected 
duration changed (Fig. 3.1). In five- and seven-second trials, the background colour 
86 
changed to light grey after the target had been tracked for one second. In seven-second 
trials, the background changed to dark grey after the target had been tracked for five 
seconds. 
Design 
We used a within-groups design; each monkey completed both the unsignalled and the 
signalled condition. Half of the monkeys were assigned to complete the unsignalled 
condition first and half were assigned to complete the signalled condition first. 
Monkeys who passed all training phases completed 40 blocks per condition, resulting in 
a total of 1920 trials (960  1 s, 480  5 s, and 480  7 s). Monkeys could complete as 
many trials per session as they wanted and completed testing over several test days 
(capuchin Mdn = 6 days, IQR = 3-9 days, range = 2-11 days; rhesus Mdn = 2.5 days, IQR = 
2-3 days, range = 1-3 days). 
Data Analysis 
To assess monkeys’ susceptibility to sunk costs, we fit mixed effects logistic regression 
models with trial completion as the binomial outcome variable (did or did not track the 
target for the entire duration; i.e., did or did not earn the reward). We included 
individual identity as a random effect to account for individual variability in 
persistence. We included required tracking duration (1, 5, and 7 s), condition 
(unsignalled and signalled), species (capuchin and rhesus), block bin (each bin 
comprised 4 blocks, i.e., 96 trials; thus, monkeys’ first condition comprised bins 1-10 
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and the second comprised bins 11-20, centred to M = 0), and training duration (total 
number of blocks required to pass criterion, standardized to M = 0 and SD = 1) as fixed 
effects. We further included trial duration  condition  species and trial 
duration  condition  block bin interaction terms. We computed pairwise contrasts for 
significant model terms. We used likelihood ratio tests using single-term deletions to 
assess each factor’s importance with respect to model fit.  
To assess monkeys’ susceptibility to sunk costs depending on how long they had 
already tracked the target, we first organized the data into seven non-exclusive subsets 
for sunk costs of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 s. That is, each subset contained data for trials at 
the points when monkeys had already tracked the target for at least 1 to 6 s, 
respectively. For example, sunk cost 0 s applied to all trials, and sunk cost 6 s applied to 
all trials for which monkeys had already tracked the target for at least 6 s (by definition, 
this subset could not include trials with tracking durations of 1 or 5 s). We then 
calculated the time remaining for the trial by subtracting the sunk cost from the 
required tracking duration. For example, if a monkey had already tracked the target for 
3 s in a 5-second trial, the time remaining was 2 s. However, for a monkey to have 2 s 
remaining in a 7-second trial, they would have already tracked the target for 5 s. That is, 
7-second trials had higher sunk costs than 5-second trials when the same amount of 
time was remaining. We excluded 1-second trials for this analysis because sunk costs 
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were always at least 0 but never more than 1 s (i.e., there was no variability in sunk 
costs for these trials).  
For the combined data, we then fit a mixed effects logistic regression model with 
trial completion as the binomial outcome variable (did or did not track the target for the 
entire duration; i.e., did or did not earn the reward). We included the trial 
duration  time remaining interaction as a fixed effect. We again included individual 
identity as a random effect to account for individual variability in baseline persistence 
and included the trial duration (5 and 7 s)  condition (unsignalled and signalled) 
 species (capuchin and rhesus) interaction as a covariate. We used likelihood ratio tests 
using single-term deletions to assess each factor’s importance with respect to model fit. 
We computed a pairwise contrast to compare the regression coefficients for 5- and 7-
second trials. If monkeys were more likely to finish tracking the target the longer they 
had already tracked it, then the probability to complete the trial should be higher for 
higher sunk costs (i.e., higher in 7- than 5-second trials if the same time was remaining), 
and it should be less affected by the time still remaining. That is, the slope for 7-second 
trials should be shallower than for 5-second trials. 
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Results 
Effects of trial duration and signalling condition 
We found a significant trial duration  condition  species interaction effect on 
monkeys’ likelihood to track the target for the required duration, 2(2) = 17.22, p < .001, 
suggesting that species differed in whether they completed trials depending on how 
long it took to do so and whether this duration was signalled or not. We dropped the 
trial duration  condition  block bin interaction term and fixed effect of training 
duration, as they did not significantly improve model fit, 2(3) = 3.87, p = .276. However, 
we found significant two-way interaction effects of block bin with trial duration, 
2(2) = 103.07, p < .001, and condition, 2(1) = 15.14, p < .001, indicating that monkeys’ 
responses changed over time. 
Overall, monkeys completed almost all 1-second trials but were 7 times less 
likely to complete 5-second trials and 10 times less likely to complete 7-second trials 
(Fig. 3.2), odds ratios (OR±SE) 5s: 6.88±0.26, 7s: 10.25±0.39, ps < .001. However, the 
magnitude of this effect depended on the species and the condition. Although capuchin 
monkeys and rhesus macaques completed 1-second trials at similar, high rates, 
capuchins became 11 and 19 times less likely to complete 5- and 7-second trials, 
respectively (OR±SE 5s: 11.45±0.45, 7s: 19.04±0.78, ps < .001). Rhesus macaques became 
only 4 times and 5.5 times less likely to do so (OR±SE 5s: 4.13±0.27, 7s: 5.52±0.36, ps < 
.001), suggesting that they suffered more from sunk cost effects than capuchins. Further, 
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when the trial duration was signalled through a change in background colour, rhesus 
macaques (OR±SE 5s: 1.27±0.07, 7s: 1.50±0.06, ps < .001) and especially capuchin 
monkeys (OR±SE 5s: 2.37±0.02, 7s: 2.88±0.02, ps < .001) became even more likely to opt 
out of the trial. 
Across conditions and species, we also found changes in trial completion over 
time suggestive of learning (Fig. 3.3). Specifically, as testing progressed, monkeys 
became more likely to opt out of 5-second and 7-second trials (b±SE 5s: -0.05±0.004, 7s: -
0.06±0.004, ps < .001) but not 1-second trials (b±SE = -0.003±0.004, p = .460). This effect 
was more pronounced in the signalled than in the unsignalled condition (b±SE = -
0.04±0.009, p < .001).  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Mean trial completion by species, trial duration, and condition. Small 
transparent points indicate individual monkeys; large points connected by lines indicate 
group means. 
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Figure 3.3. Mean trial completion by species, trial duration, condition, and trial block 
bin. Bins comprised 4 blocks (96 trials). Note that monkeys completed 10 bins of each 
condition, either the signalled condition first (bins 1-10) and then the unsignalled 
second (bins 11-20), or the unsignalled condition first (bins 1-10) and the signalled 
second (bins 11-20). Thus, each panel shows data from different monkeys in bins 1-10 
and 11-20, depending on the order that they completed the conditions.  
 
Effect of time already spent tracking 
We found a significant trial duration  time remaining interaction effect on monkeys’ 
likelihood to track the target for the required duration (Fig. 3.4), 2(1) = 95.92, p < .001. 
Monkeys became more likely to complete the trial when less time was remaining, i.e., 
the longer they had already tracked the target. However, this effect was stronger in 5-
second than in the 7-second trials (b±SE 5s: -0.48±0.01 vs. 7s: -0.37±0.01, p < .001). That is, 
in 7-second trials, in which sunk costs were by definition higher than in 5-second trials 
if the same time was remaining, the likelihood to complete the trial was less affected by 
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the time remaining. In other words, for a given remaining time, monkeys were also 
more likely to finish tracking the target if they had already tracked it for longer.  
 
 
Figure 3.4. Mean trial completion by trial duration and time remaining. Time 
remaining refers to durations of at most X seconds, e.g., if a monkey had tracked the 
target for 3.2 seconds, the sunk cost (time already spent tracking) was considered to be 3 
seconds and the time remaining either 2 seconds (in a 5-second trial) or 4 seconds (in a 
7-second trial).  
 
Discussion 
Capuchin and rhesus monkeys showed pronounced sunk cost effects in this study. 
Instead of opting out and forfeiting their initial small investment, both species persisted 
5 to 7 times longer than was optimal and were especially likely to complete a trial the 
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longer they had already persisted. We found that rhesus macaques were more 
susceptible to the sunk costs than capuchin monkeys and that both species showed 
more pronounced sunk cost effects when changes in trial duration were not signalled. 
These findings suggest that uncertainty plays a part in the emergence of this bias and 
highlight that qualitatively similar responses can still vary in magnitude both across 
and within species.  
To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of the sunk cost effect in 
nonhuman primates. Together with previous evidence of the effect in more distantly 
related species like pigeons, rats, and mice8,17–20,22,23, our results suggest that this bias can 
emerge as a result of evolved decision-making strategies that are widely shared across 
animal taxa and do not require human-unique processes, such as those underlying 
human language, formal economic markets, or self-rationalization. In particular, our 
finding that the sunk cost effect was more pronounced when changes in tracking 
duration were unsignalled indicates that the effect may arise because continued 
investment helps animals resolve uncertainty about future expected costs and benefits. 
Indeed, in pigeons, the sunk cost effect disappears completely when information about 
changes in the expected work requirement is provided8. However, in primates, lack of 
information about when exactly it becomes optimal to opt out does not explain 
everything, as both capuchin and rhesus monkeys still showed pronounced sunk cost 
effects in the signalled condition. 
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One possible explanation is that primates overly rely on heuristics that use their 
past investment as a proxy for future costs and benefits or adjust how much they value 
an expected outcome based on their past investment. Heuristics are computationally 
simple rules of thumb that are likely to evolve if they work well in most situations that 
animals encounter, but they can sometimes lead to consistently suboptimal choices37. 
The sunk cost effect may arise as a result of such heuristics, especially when the cost is 
low compared to the optimal response (see ref. 35). Indeed, pigeons8,17, rats18, and 
humans in a similar paradigm38 are less susceptible to sunk costs when persisting to 
trial completion requires much more work than opting out to begin a new, likely 
shorter trial. These results suggest that the sunk cost effect only arises when it is 
“mildly” suboptimal to show it. Unlike pigeons and rats, capuchin and rhesus monkeys 
show this behaviour even when changes in expected effort are signalled, suggesting 
that primates may be more reliant on heuristics. Future work should compare humans’ 
responses to sunk costs in signalled versus unsignalled versions of the paradigm8,38 to 
assess this possibility empirically. 
This sensitivity in response to different task contingencies raises the question of 
how much animals understand about them and how they came to do so. Of course, they 
cannot be told the rules of the task ahead of time and need to learn over time through 
trial and error. Indeed, we found that monkeys’ responses in the test condition changed 
over time. They initially completed trials of all durations at high levels, as they did in 
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training, but opted out of more 5- and 7-second trials (but not 1-second trials) as testing 
progressed. That is, their responses became more optimal over time. One possibility is 
that monkeys who easily learned to track the target (as evidenced by fewer trials before 
they met the training criteria) simply continued tracking the target in the test condition, 
too. For example, rhesus monkeys met the training requirement sooner and also 
completed test trials (showing a stronger sunk cost effect) at higher rates than 
capuchins. However, we found no statistical effect of training trials required on trial 
completion, nor can this explanation account for why they did not continue tracking 
trials of all durations at high levels or for the differences in signalling conditions. 
Alternatively, fast learners might be expected to also learn the contingencies of 
suboptimal versus optimal opting out, but this would not explain why monkeys of both 
species plateaued to complete at least 25% of 5- or 7-second trials at all. Thus, although 
learning certainly occurred, monkeys’ sunk cost effects in this study did not seem to 
arise from differences in learning.  
Nonetheless, rhesus macaques showed a stronger sunk cost effect than capuchin 
monkeys in this study. In the unsignalled condition, all rhesus completed more 5- and 
7-second trials than any of the capuchin monkeys, and they responded less to 
transitions in trial duration being signalled. Although the overall pattern of responses 
cannot be fully explained by training experiences, the training data may still provide 
insight into this species difference. That rhesus monkeys reached the training criteria in 
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many fewer trials than capuchins suggests that completing the task was generally easier 
for them to do. Therefore, the additional effort of tracking to trial completion may have 
presented even less of a cost to rhesus than to capuchin monkeys, favouring the sunk 
cost effect in this situation. This fits evidence from prior research that nonhuman 
primates may be more likely than humans to take a more optimal shortcut because the 
familiar, trained strategy is harder for them to learn and execute than it is for 
humans34,39. If so, we would expect humans in a comparable task to show even stronger 
sunk cost effects and would expect that the benefit from opting out compared to 
persisting would need to be larger than for rhesus macaques (whose in turn should be 
larger than for capuchins) in order to for them to consistently opt out. Future 
comparative research should also extend this work to contexts other than continued 
motor action (for example, ref. 23) to investigate how general these effects are.  
In this study, we report the first evidence for sunk cost effects in primates other 
than humans. We found that monkeys were less susceptible to the bias when transitions 
in expected additional work were signalled, indicating that animals may suboptimally 
persist, in part, because doing so resolves uncertainty about future outcomes. However, 
sunk cost effects emerged even when this uncertainty was removed and after continued 
experience with the task contingencies. We suggest that the sunk cost effect, a hallmark 
of human economic decision-making, may arise from evolutionarily ancient 
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mechanisms that function to balance the costs and benefits for a given species’ cognitive 
abilities and environment. 
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Abstract 
As humans, we often need to hold ourselves and others to objective, absolute standards 
when making decisions. Although our concepts can change in response to societal 
developments or additional information, our judgments should not be swayed by 
extraneous factors such as the sequence or frequency of events to be judged. Yet when 
items become less frequent, humans respond by expanding their concept of it to include 
more ambiguous stimuli. We assessed the origins of this bias by testing capuchin and 
rhesus monkeys in a computer task in which they had to classify circles of different 
sizes as either small or large. Small and large circles initially appeared with equal 
probability but, over time, either small or large circles became less frequent. In contrast 
to humans, capuchin and rhesus monkeys responded by contracting, rather than 
expanding, their concepts of the less frequent category. When large circles became rare, 
monkeys were more likely to judge intermediate sized circles as small, and when small 
circles became rare, monkeys were more likely to judge those same circles as large. 
These results suggest that difficulties in maintaining absolute standards are widely 
shared with other animals, but human-unique tendencies may lead us to overcorrect 
shifts in our responses, especially if feedback about the accuracy of our judgments is 
unavailable. 
Keywords: decision-making bias, frequency effect, concept expansion, rhesus 
macaque, capuchin monkey, Macaca mulatta, Sapajus [Cebus] apella  
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Introduction 
Humans in modern society frequently make judgments based on – ideally – objective 
standards, for example, when we judge what counts as a crime, a great manuscript, or a 
score in sports. However, some judgments (like verifying plagiarism or scoring a 
touchdown in American football) are easier to assess than others (like grading writing 
style or scoring a figure skating routine), and both more quantitative and more 
qualitative standards may change over time. For example, what we now consider sexist 
or racist behavior is vastly different compared to just a decade or two ago, illustrating 
that our concepts sometimes expand to include a broader set of situations. Such concept 
expansion (or contraction) sometimes arises from broader societal impacts, such as 
changes in cultural norms and laws or activist movements. However, lowering or 
raising our standards is not always desirable. For example, when we aim to reduce 
statistics such as scientific misconduct rates, we should not unintentionally adjust our 
definition of data fabrication to include honest mistakes in data entry. Here we 
investigate a cognitive quirk that may lead to such suboptimal changes in our 
standards: to some extent, we may expand our concepts of events simply because they 
become rarer, and contract them because they become more frequent. 
In a recent study, people had to judge circles as blue or purple, faces as 
threatening or non-threatening, and research proposals as unethical or ethical (Levari et 
al., 2018). Initially, the two respective categories appeared on an equal number of trials, 
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but as testing progressed, the frequency of blue, threatening, and unethical stimuli was 
gradually decreased to appearing in 50% of trials to just 6% of trials. When these 
categories became rarer, participants did classify fewer stimuli as blue, threatening, and 
unethical, but they included more ambiguous stimuli (purplish circles, neutral faces, 
and harmless proposals) in those categories than they had when these stimuli were 
more prevalent. This response held when participants were told about the 
phenomenon, or even when they were paid to resist it. This concept expansion is 
irrational because the frequency of an event or behavior should not be factored into our 
judgments. If the number of violent crimes decreases, we do not want to now include 
previously innocuous behavior in our definition of assault simply because this type of 
offense has become less common. This example illustrates that adjusting our standards 
in response to frequency alone would be particularly problematic in cases in which we 
strive for absolute standards in theory but that often require subjective judgement in 
practice, such as in assessing criminal or immoral intent.  
This finding fits a growing literature showing that we make relative rather than 
absolute judgments in various contexts, which can systematically bias our decision-
making (e.g., Camerer, 2003; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1980, 1992, 2016). Indeed, our brains seem wired to do so, as 
neuron responses adapt to reflect value information relative to previous outcomes 
rather than proportional to objective value (Khaw et al., 2017; Louie et al., 2013; 
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Parducci, 1968; Rangel & Clithero, 2012; Tymula & Plassmann, 2016), suggesting that 
this tendency is evolutionarily ancient. We need to better understand how and under 
which circumstances factors such as frequency or the sequence of events affect our 
judgments in order to make better decisions. Indeed, the finding that humans expand 
their concepts for items that become more frequent not only for social or moral 
situations (judging faces and research proposals) but also for perceptual judgments 
(judging circle color) suggest that this frequency effect does not arise solely in response 
to societal pressures. One way to study this is to test whether other animals, who are 
not subject to human culture and society, share this bias. Doing so allows us to assess 
how widely the underlying mechanisms may be shared and can provide insight into the 
evolutionary pressures that gave rise to them (e.g., Santos & Rosati, 2015; Watzek & 
Brosnan, 2020c).  
In this study, we assessed whether capuchin and rhesus monkeys, like humans, 
would expand their concepts of items that became less frequent over time. Both species 
are susceptible to some of the same decision-making biases as humans in some contexts 
that favor relative rather than absolute judgments (Chen et al., 2006; Egan Brad et al., 
2016; Lakshminarayanan et al., 2011; Lakshminaryanan et al., 2008; Watzek & Brosnan, 
2020c, 2020a; see also Santos & Rosati, 2015; Watzek & Brosnan, 2020b), but not in others 
(Cohen & Santos, 2016; Watzek & Brosnan, 2018; Watzek et al., 2018, 2019; Xu et al., 
2011). Further, there is some evidence that these monkeys expand their perceptual 
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concepts in the context of visual illusions (Agrillo et al., 2014a, 2014b; Fujita, 1997; 
Parrish, Brosnan, et al., 2015; Parrish, Evans, et al., 2015) and change their valuation of a 
reward depending on the sequence of events (Blanchard et al., 2014; Egan Brad et al., 
2016; but see Xu et al., 2011), suggesting that their concepts may be similarly susceptible 
to the frequency effect as humans.  
In our task, loosely modeled after Levari et al. (2018), monkeys had to judge 
circles of varying sizes as large or small. Circles of any size were initially just as likely to 
appear as any other, but over time, either the small or the large circles became less 
frequent. We predicted that the monkeys, similar to humans, would respond by 
including more ambiguous circles of medium size in the category that became less 
frequent. In contrast to Levari and colleagues, the monkeys in our study received 
immediate feedback on their judgments after each trial. This was a practical necessity, 
as our monkeys are accustomed to participating in cognitive and behavioral testing that 
yields high-value food rewards in addition to their daily diet, but this methodological 
change also allowed us to assess the role of feedback. If this frequency effect emerges in 
humans simply because participants did not receive information about the ‘objective 
truth’ (which, indeed, is often not available in real-life scenarios, either), then we would 
not expect to see the effect when such feedback is provided. Testing this possibility is 
crucial to designing interventions for specific situations in which we want to ensure that 
we make decisions based on absolute and not relative standards.  
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Methods 
Participants 
We tested 25 capuchin monkeys (17 female, 8 male, age: M  SD = 17.88  8.19, range: 7 
to ca. 45 years) and 7 rhesus macaques (all male, age: M  SD = 23.57  7.35, range: 16-37 
years) at the Language Research Center at Georgia State University. 
Capuchin monkeys were socially housed in mixed-sex groups, each with their 
own indoor/outdoor enclosures with a variety of climbing structures, visual barriers, 
and regularly provided enrichment devices (e.g., foraging boards and puzzle boxes). 
Capuchins had been trained to separate voluntarily into testing boxes attached to their 
indoor enclosures for cognitive and behavioral studies. They were never required to 
come into the test boxes for testing and they could choose not to participate at any time 
without consequences. Rhesus monkeys were individually housed with continuous 
auditory and visual access to other monkeys and, when possible, regular social periods 
with compatible partners. Their enclosures doubled as testing boxes, but they too could 
choose not to participate at any time without consequences.  
All monkeys had access to water at all times, including during testing, and were 
never food deprived (except for medical reasons unrelated to research studies). All 
testing food was given in addition to their daily diet of vegetables, fruit, and primate 
chow. 
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Procedure 
We generated 50 circles with different radii ranging from 32.8 to 110 pixels (displayed 
on an 800600-pixel screen), with circle radii increasing by 2.5% from one circle to the 
next (Fig. 4.1). We refer to circles 1-25 as the “small spectrum,” and to circles 26-50 as 
the “large spectrum.”  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Test stimuli from the small and large spectrums. Circles 1, 10, 20, 30, 40, 
and 50 from left to right. 
 
Monkeys were tested in individual test boxes that connected to their indoor 
enclosures. They moved an onscreen cursor using a joystick that is part of their 
computer testing system (for details see Evans et al., 2008). Each trial, monkeys saw one 
of these circles at random and needed to classify it as “small” or “large” by selecting 
one of two arbitrary icons (Fig. 4.2). Icon assignment and placement (left or right) was 
counterbalanced across monkeys but remained the same for a given monkey 
throughout the experiment.  
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Figure 4.2. Trial screen. Monkeys saw circles one at a time and needed to classify them 
as “small” or “large” by selecting one of the two icons.  
 
When the monkeys correctly classified circles from the small spectrum as “small” 
or circles from the large spectrum as “large,” they received positive auditory feedback 
(whoop) and a banana-flavored food pellet. When they incorrectly classified circles from 
the small spectrum as “large” or circles from the large spectrum as “small,” they 
received negative auditory feedback (buzz) and a 2.5-second timeout. Each trial was 
followed by a 1-second inter-trial interval (in addition to the timeout, if applicable) 
before the next trial began.  
During training, monkeys were gradually introduced to circles from the different 
ends of the spectrum. Monkeys automatically advanced to the next phase when they 
reached 80% accuracy in two separate trial blocks (Table 4.1). In Training 1 and 2, 
monkeys completed blocks of 30 trials. In Training 1, each block consisted of 15 trials 
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Table 4.1. Training performance. Number of blocks required to meet criterion for the 
first time and number of monkeys who did and did not ever meet the criterion for each 
phase. 
Phase 
Circles 
Presented 
Species 
Blocks to Meet Criterion 
Npassed Nfailed 
Mdn IQR Range 
1 1 & 50 Capuchin 80 20.5-145.5 4-652 18 7 
2 1-15 & 36-50 Capuchin 12.5 3.5-20.75 2-57 16 2 
3 1-25 & 26-50 Capuchin 4.5 4-10 2-25 14 2 
1 1 & 50 Rhesus 56 18.75-91.75 10-188 6 1 
2 1-15 & 36-50 Rhesus 27 7-67.25 6-129 6 0 
3 1-25 & 26-50 Rhesus 15.5 3.25-31.5 2-42 6 0 
 
with circle 1 (small) and 15 trials with circle 50 (large), presented in a random order. In 
Training 2, each block consisted of 15 trials with circles 1-15 (small) and 15 trials with 
circles 36-50 (large), each circle size presented once in a random order. In Training 3, 
monkeys completed blocks of 50 trials, 25 trials with circles 1-25 (small) and 25 trials 
with circles 26-50 (large), each circle size presented once in a random order. 
Classification for 16-35 (i.e., the more ambiguous, medium sized circles) was not 
considered relevant for the training criterion in this phase, because correct learning of 
the small/large distinction should result in (near) indifference for these circles. 
However, they still appeared in this training phase so that these trials were identical to 
the baseline testing trials, ensuring that transition to testing was imperceptible and 
nondisruptive to the participants. Thus, to meet criterion, monkeys had to reach 80% 
accuracy in the 30 trials presenting circles 1-15 and 36-50, just as in Training 2. Testing 
began immediately, with no indication to the monkeys that anything had changed. 
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During testing, monkeys completed 10 blocks of 50 trials. In the control condition, 
circles were sampled from the small and large spectrums with equal probability 
(identical to training). In the fewer-large condition, large circles were shown less 
frequently as testing progressed across blocks. Likewise, in the fewer-small condition, 
small circles were shown less frequently. Specifically, circles were sampled from the 
small (or large) spectrum in 50% of trials in test blocks 1-2, 40% in block 3, 28% in block 
4, 16% in block 5, and 6% in blocks 6-10. These probabilities were chosen to compare the 
results to the progression used by Levari and colleagues (2018). 
We used a within-groups design; monkeys each completed all three conditions 
(control, fewer-large, and fewer-small), with the order fully counterbalanced. Monkeys 
completed the training phase before each of the three conditions and did not begin a 
new condition on the same testing day that they had completed a previous one. If a 
monkey did not complete a condition on a given test day (e.g., because they did not 
meet the training criteria, lacked motivation, or because testing time was limited by the 
research schedule), the condition was repeated on the next testing day. Monkeys 
completed a total of up to 9 test sessions (three per condition). Eight capuchins and 6 
rhesus monkeys completed all 9 test sessions. Six capuchins completed 1-6 test sessions 
during the limited time period available for testing. Inclusion of their data does not 
change the pattern of results and all data are provided in a publicly available repository 
(see data availability).  
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Results 
To assess whether decreasing the frequency of small or large circles expanded 
participants’ size concepts, we fit a mixed effects logistic regression model with choice 
as the binomial outcome variable (“small” or “large” judgements). We included 
individual identity as a random effect to account for individual variability in baseline 
size thresholds. We included circle size (1-50), block (1-10), condition (control, fewer-
small, and fewer-large), species (capuchin and rhesus), session (1-9), and their 
interactions as fixed effects. To aid model conversion, we rescaled block by dividing by 
10 (new range: 0.1-1), session by dividing by 9 (new range: 0.11-1), and circle size by 
dividing by 10 and subtracting 2.55 (new range: -2.45-2.45, with 0 indicating the 
midpoint between the small and large spectrums). We computed pairwise contrasts for 
significant model terms. We used likelihood ratio tests using single-term deletions to 
assess each factor’s importance with respect to model fit.  
We found a significant circle size  block  condition  species interaction effect 
on monkeys’ likelihood to classify a circle as “large,” 2(2) = 13.7, p = .001. Objectively 
larger circles were more likely to be classified as “large,” but whether the threshold for 
“large” judgments shifted over the course of the session depended on the condition and 
the species (Figs. 4.3 & 4.4). Specifically, in the control condition, classification for the 
same size circle did not change over time, (predicted slope for a hypothetical objectively 
medium circle of size 25.5: b±SE = -0.01±0.06, p = .913). In contrast, as testing progressed,  
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Figure 4.3. Size judgments early and late in the session by circle size, species, and 
condition. Small transparent points indicate individual monkeys; solid lines and 
transparent bands indicate logistic regression fit and 95% confidence interval. For 
visualization only, circles were binned and only data from blocks at the beginning 
(when small and large circles were equally likely) or at the end (when either small or 
large circles appeared in only 6% of trials in the fewer-small and fewer-large conditions, 
respectively) of the test sessions are shown. 
 
monkeys became more likely to classify the same size circle as small when large circles 
became less frequent (in the fewer-large condition; b±SE = -2.61±0.08, p < .001). Similarly, 
monkeys became more likely to classify the same size circle as large when smaller 
circles became less frequent (in the fewer-small condition, b±SE = 2.80±0.08, p < .001). 
That is, monkeys’ “large” judgments included fewer objectively large circles in the 
fewer-large condition and monkeys’ “small” judgments included fewer objectively 
small circles in the fewer-small condition. Notably, monkeys did not only shift their size 
judgments for the ambiguous, intermediate-sized circles, but also for the objectively  
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Figure 4.4. Size judgments for small, medium, and large circles by block, species, and 
condition. Point ranges indicate group means and 95% confidence intervals. For 
visualization, circle sizes were binned and only circles 1-10 (small), 21-30 (medium), and 
41-50 (large) are shown. In blocks 1-2 of a test session, small and large circles were 
equally likely, but in the fewer-small and fewer-large conditions, either small or large 
circles (respectively) became less likely and appeared in only 6% of trials from blocks 6-
10. 
 
very large or very small circles that they had classified correctly in at least 80% of trials 
during training. For the half of the spectrum that became less common, monkeys now 
misclassified these circles in up to half the time. Another way of understanding this 
shift is by examining monkeys’ indifference point – the circle size which they were 
equally likely to judge as small or large. In the fewer-large condition, the indifference 
point became a larger-than-medium circle; in the fewer-small condition, it became a 
smaller-than-medium circle. 
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Although capuchin monkeys and rhesus macaques classified circles of varying 
sizes as large at similar rates in the control condition (b±SE capuchin: 0.08±0.07 vs. 
rhesus: -0.10±0.09, p = .103), capuchins’ size judgements shifted more than rhesus’ in 
both the fewer-large (b±SE capuchin: -2.93±0.10 vs. rhesus: -2.28±0.13, p < .001) and 
fewer-small conditions (b±SE capuchin: 3.26±0.10 vs. rhesus: 2.34±0.13, p < .001), 
suggesting that they were more sensitive to changes in how frequently circles of 
different sizes were presented. 
 
Discussion 
Capuchin and rhesus monkeys in this study showed robust shifts in their size 
judgments when either small or large circles became less frequent. However, against 
our predictions, monkeys adjusted their size judgments in the opposite direction as 
humans did in a similar experiment (Levari et al., 2018). When large circles became rare, 
monkeys classified intermediate-sized (and even some large) circles as small; when 
small circles became rare, monkeys classified the same intermediate-sized (and some 
small) circles as large. That is, monkeys showed concept contraction rather than concept 
expansion for the (now) minority category. Humans, on the other hand, showed 
concept expansion, including more ambiguous stimuli in the category that became rare 
(Levari et al., 2018). 
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One possibility for this difference is that the monkeys in our study received 
immediate feedback for each of their judgments. When large circles became rare (in the 
fewer-large condition), monkeys encountered more small circles and were rewarded for 
judging them as small (and vice versa in the fewer-small condition). Thus, monkeys 
may have learned the most common response for each test session and, perhaps 
habitually, also made this judgment when more medium sized circles appeared. 
However, monkeys’ responses were not indiscriminate (i.e., they did not simply always 
make the same judgment), as they still classified very large circles as large and very 
small circles as small even when they appeared only in a few trials. Lack of attention 
therefore does not seem to be a likely explanation. Instead, monkeys’ indifference point 
– the size at which they were equally likely to judge a circle as small or large – became a 
larger-than-medium circle in the fewer-large condition (and a smaller-than-medium 
circle in the fewer-small condition).  
Although information about the objective truth may not always be available in 
real-world scenarios, studying the extent to which humans would respond similarly to 
monkeys in response to trial-by-trial feedback is an open and highly necessary question 
for research. If humans continue to show this bias even when feedback is available, this 
would suggest that mechanisms unique to humans, such as those arising from human 
language, culture, or formal institutions like markets, underlie the effect. Perhaps 
humans implicitly expect a minimum number of items from both ends of a spectrum. 
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However, humans were susceptible to concept expansion even when they were told 
about the effect and were incentivized to resist it (Levari et al., 2018), suggesting that 
this bias may be difficult to combat through reasoned thinking. If, on the other hand, 
humans, like monkeys in our study, do not expand their concepts for rare stimuli when 
they receive feedback, this would suggest that cognitive mechanisms that we share with 
other animals give rise to the bias. For example, primates may not easily detect changes 
in stimuli frequencies without clear information about which category any given 
stimulus belongs to. In this scenario, we may therefore adjust our estimates too slowly 
(or not enough) and respond accordingly by sorting more stimuli into the minority 
category than there actually are. Future research is needed to explore these possibilities. 
Notably, a shift away from the true medium in either direction was suboptimal. 
Monkeys still lost time (in the form of a timeout) and forfeited food rewards because 
any shift led to more misclassified circles (especially circles of the minority category). 
However, stimuli from that category only appeared in 6% of the trials in the second half 
of the test session, resulting in relatively few errors if monkeys adopted a “mostly 
choose small” (or large) strategy. It is possible that such a strategy, while not optimal, 
conferred enough of a benefit to offset this cost because such a heuristic strategy may be 
computationally easier to follow (see also Camerer, 1998; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; 
Stevens, 2012). Indeed, this strategy would become optimal if stimuli from the (now) 
less frequent category completely disappeared, that is, if the trend continued. It is 
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possible that high sensitivity to the changing availability of options that an animal 
encounters and interacts with is adaptive. Quick adjustments in strategies, even if they 
overshoot, may be favored in such circumstances, especially if environments change 
over space and time (The Modelling Animal Decisions Group et al., 2014), for example, 
if an animal relies on ephemeral fruit patches.  
In this study, we tested whether capuchin and rhesus monkeys, like humans, 
respond to events that decrease in frequency by expanding their concepts for them, that 
is, by including more ambiguous stimuli in the now less frequent category. We found 
that monkeys showed exactly the opposite pattern when they received feedback on 
their judgments, considering almost all stimuli to belong to the now more common 
category. Our findings support previous evidence that animals including humans make 
relative rather than absolute judgments. We suggest that such shifts in decision-making 
are adaptive in situations that animals may encounter in their environments. However, 
human-unique tendencies may lead us to overcorrect shifts in our responses, especially 
if information about the accuracy of our judgments is unavailable. Further research is 
needed to more fully assess the cognitive mechanisms that underlie this bias, which will 
help us combat it in situations when we do want to uphold absolute standards. 
 
Ethics   This study was purely behavioural, non-invasive, and was carried out in 
accordance with all applicable international, national, and institutional ethical 
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guidelines and legal requirements. All procedures were approved by the Georgia State 
University Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC A19028 and A20018 
for capuchins and A19029 for rhesus). Georgia State University is fully accredited by the 
Association for Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care (AALAC). 
 
Data availability   The data generated and analysed during this study will be 
made publicly available at the Harvard Dataverse. 
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5 
CONCLUSIONS: LEARNING FROM MISTAKES 
 
Humans and animals alike make thousands of decisions every day that affect our own 
lives as well as those of others. In doing so, however, we navigate complex 
environments in which we often have to rely on imperfect information and, even if we 
had perfect information, we may not have the cognitive abilities to derive the optimal 
strategy every time. As a result, we sometimes make bad decisions, and much research 
has explored under which circumstances such irrational decision-making occurs. 
Because these decision-making biases can have far-reaching consequences for our lives, 
it is important to understand why we fall for them. Unfortunately, the underlying 
mechanisms are often unclear. In this dissertation, I used a comparative approach to 
assess whether animals make similarly bad decisions. Doing so helps us learn about 
human decision-making and, potentially, develop interventions to improve decision-
making in situations in which it is warranted, such as saving for the future. Moreover, 
these results have important implications for how we design comparative studies, as I 
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found that seemingly minor factors, such as the presence of other food and the 
frequency with which stimuli are presented, can inadvertently affect animals’ decisions. 
In Chapter 1 (Watzek & Brosnan, 2020), I assessed the degree to which studying 
the extent to which other species respond in similar ways as we do yields unique 
insights into our own behavior, discuss challenges faced by studies of animal decision-
making, and propose future directions for such comparative research. Based on this 
analysis, this dissertation expanded on this line of research through several studies in 
which I investigated decision-making biases in capuchin monkeys and rhesus 
macaques, two primate species that share a number of irrational behaviors with 
humans (see also Addessi et al., 2020; Santos & Rosati, 2015). In particular, I focused on 
better understanding the circumstances under which these biases emerge and carefully 
considered the, often underappreciated, role of methodology. 
 
Summary of Findings 
Across one manual and two computer tasks, I found that capuchin and rhesus 
monkeys’ choices consistently shift in response to factors that should be irrelevant to 
maximizing the expected benefits and minimizing the expected costs, resulting in 
economically irrational responses. These results suggest that many decision-making 
biases do not rely solely on human-unique factors, such as language and culture, or 
formal institutions, such as economic markets or education systems. However, I also 
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found important differences between monkey and human decision-making in these 
situations, providing further insight into the relative contribution of different cognitive 
mechanisms that may underlie these biases. 
In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that capuchin monkeys, like humans, are 
susceptible to a range of context effects. Capuchins devalued a food item when a better 
one was present, but unavailable (contrast effect), but overvalued a food item when an 
inferior option was available (decoy effect) or when the food, if unchosen, was given to 
a conspecific (social context effect). The contrast effect was almost twice as large as the 
decoy and social context effect, suggesting that devaluing food items in the presence of 
better ones may be a more adaptive response in other contexts.  
In Chapter 3, I reported the first evidence of sunk cost effects in primates other 
than humans. Capuchin and rhesus monkeys were more likely to persist in a 
psychomotor computer task the more time and effort they had already invested, even 
when doing so was suboptimal compared to opting out. I found that sunk cost effects 
emerge especially when information about future outcomes is uncertain. Persisting may 
therefore provide an opportunity to gain more information. The effect remains when 
such uncertainty is removed, however, suggesting that animals may broadly rely on 
heuristics that use prior effort as a proxy for future outcomes or to adjust their 
evaluation of eventual outcomes. 
127 
In contrast to the previous studies, in Chapter 4 I found that capuchin monkeys 
and rhesus macaques behave differently than humans in how they judge rare stimuli. 
Specifically, both monkey species shifted their judgments of stimuli that occur less often 
by contracting their concepts for them, i.e., by including previously ambiguous stimuli 
in the now more common category. When large circles became rare, monkeys judged 
intermediate (and even some large circles) as small. Conversely, when small circles 
became rare, monkeys judged those same intermediate circles (and even some small 
circles) as large. Like humans, monkeys were unable to maintain absolute standards 
when stimuli changed in prevalence, suggesting that such shifts in judgment may be 
adaptive in natural environments. However, unlike humans, monkeys adjusted their 
‘definitions’ of the categories by contracting rather than expanding their concepts for 
the minority category. One possibility is that psychological mechanisms unique to 
humans lead us to overcorrect such shifts in the opposite direction. However, future 
research is needed to determine how humans respond in a similar procedure and to 
assess the role of information uncertainty in driving this response. 
 
Implications 
Evolutionary roots of bad decision-making 
Overall, I found robust evidence that primates other than humans are also susceptible 
to (theoretically) choice-irrelevant factors such as the presence of a superior or inferior 
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option, the outcomes of a group member, their prior investments, and the prevalence of 
stimuli in some situations. These findings show that biased decision-making does not 
arise simply as a result of abilities that are unique to humans, such as human language 
and culture, or environments that are built by humans, such as formal economic or 
political systems. Instead, irrational behavior is likely, at least in part, the result of 
evolved mechanisms. 
This possibility raises the question of why strategies that lead to bad decision-
making would evolve. If bad decisions lead to decreased survival or reproductive 
success, then behaviors that lead to them should die out. To better understand which 
circumstances might favor such strategies, then, we need to consider an organism’s 
decision-making in the context of its environment, to see whether these decisions really 
do lead to decreased evolutionary fitness. In many cases, they do not (e.g., Watzek & 
Brosnan, 2018). Thus, I argue that the monkeys’ irrational behavior in this dissertation 
can be understood quite well under the overarching frameworks of bounded and 
ecological rationality (Camerer, 1998; De Petrillo & Rosati, 2019; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 
2009; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Gigerenzer & Todd, 
1999; Kacelnik, 2006; Stevens, 2012, p. 201; The Modelling Animal Decisions Group et 
al., 2014).  
In this view, biased decision-making is the result of heuristics, or 
computationally simple rules of thumb, gone awry. Heuristics can be favored by 
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evolution when they work well in most situations that an animal actually encounters, 
even if they occasionally lead to suboptimal choices. In these scenarios, the benefit from 
using a simpler strategy is greater than the infrequent cost of getting it wrong, 
especially if such errors are not particularly costly (e.g., Houston, 1997; Watzek & 
Brosnan, 2018). For example, considering the results of Chapter 4, the changing 
frequency of stimuli in a natural environment (e.g., patches of ripe fruit) may typically 
be predictive of those items disappearing soon. Thus, it would be adaptive for monkeys 
to change adjust their behavior accordingly. Similarly, considering sunk costs (Chapter 
3), the time and effort that an animal has already spent may typically correlate with 
future benefits, such that further persistence does result in optimal outcomes. However, 
in an experimental context, when such spatial or temporal relationships are deliberately 
removed, this change in behavior results in suboptimal choices. 
This dissertation illustrates how assessing differences and similarities in how 
multiple species respond to the same problem can help us tease apart potential 
explanations for a phenomenon, particularly because several of these (including 
human-unique ones) may play a role. For example, sunk cost effects in monkeys seem 
to emerge, in part but not entirely, because information about the future may be 
uncertain (Chapter 3). In pigeons, on the other hand, signaling changes in expected 
effort completely eliminated the sunk cost effect in most birds (Navarro & Fantino, 
2005). This pattern suggests that monkeys employ additional mechanisms in this 
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situation. Similarly, tendencies that are unique to humans may explain why we respond 
to changes in stimulus frequency in the opposite direction to monkeys (Chapter 4).  
Importantly, not only is the comparative approach well-suited to assess the 
relative importance that different psychological processes play in giving rise to 
decision-making biases, but it can also help us understand our own behavior better than 
studying humans alone. For example, animals other than humans show the endowment 
effect – the tendency to overvalue items in our possession compared to the same items 
not in our possession – in some circumstances, but only for food or tools that can be 
used to obtain food (Brosnan et al., 2007, 2012; Drayton et al., 2013; Flemming et al., 
2012; Kanngiesser et al., 2011; Lakshminaryanan et al., 2008). One of-debated aspect of 
the endowment effect in humans is its variability across studies and contexts, and the 
results in animals suggest the reason for this (Jones & Brosnan, 2008). Indeed, this 
research has spurred new investigations into the role of the “evolutionary salience” of 
the items, which explain much of the variation in humans’ susceptibility to the effect 
(Jaeger et al., 2020; Jones & Brosnan, 2008). Similarly, an innovative study using a 
comparable paradigm to test rodents’ and humans’ susceptibility to the sunk cost effect 
recently found that the effect does not emerge when an individual first decides whether 
or not to invest, but instead arises only while the individual needs to maintain the 
investment (Sweis et al., 2018). These examples nicely illustrate how comparative 
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research of decision-making biases can lead to novel insights and testable hypotheses 
about human behavior as well. 
 
Methodological considerations for assessing bad decision-making 
This series of experiments also highlights the importance of carefully considering 
methodological details when conducting experiments designed to compare the 
behavior across different studies or across multiple species. For example, seemingly 
minor methodological aspects such as changing the background color of the computer 
screen greatly reduced the magnitude of monkeys’ sunk effect (Chapter 3). Similarly, 
although previous evidence for the decoy effect in primates was mixed, here I found 
that capuchins were susceptible to the effect (Chapter 2). However, monkeys only 
increased their preferences for the target food (which looked better in comparison to the 
smaller decoy) when their initial preferences for this food were weak, not when their 
initial preferences were strong. The opposite pattern emerged for contrast effects, in 
which monkeys’ preference for the target food decreased when a better food was 
present, but only when initial preferences were relatively strong. These results suggest 
that floor and ceiling effects around variability in initial food preferences may have 
obscured context effects in previous studies. Here I carefully calibrated monkeys’ 
baseline preferences by using different food items and sizes across monkeys and by 
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using a countable food item as a ‘price unit.’ Such details are important to assess how 
broadly decision-making biases emerge. 
Differences in methodology are particularly tricky when comparing different 
species. For example, monkeys show concept contraction in response to changes in 
stimuli prevalence – the opposite pattern to humans, who show concept expansion 
(Chapter 4). However, monkeys received immediate feedback on their size judgments, 
whereas humans received no feedback at all about how accurate their judgments were. 
This difference, while to some extent unavoidable when testing these monkeys, makes it 
difficult to assess whether this finding arises from a true species difference or results 
from objective information being made available or not. An obvious next step to 
differentiate between these possibilities is to test a human population with a 
comparable paradigm to the one I used with monkeys. 
Research on decision-making biases in animals is itself affected by 
methodological choices, but the findings also have practical implications for studies of 
animal cognition that focus primarily on other topics. Because such research typically 
relies on animals’ behavior, it is important for researchers to carefully consider the 
presence of factors that are not of interest to the research question but that may 
nonetheless inadvertently bias animals’ choices (such as the presence of other food 
items or conspecifics, changes in the required effort, or the sequence of options), and 
ensure that they do not vary systematically across test conditions. 
133 
 
Future Directions: The Fun is in the Error Bars 
Studying and comparing decision-making biases in species other than humans is a 
promising approach to better understanding why, how, and when they occur. Although 
such research has yielded valuable insights, and I hope that this dissertation contributes 
to this body of knowledge, there is still much that we do not know. As noted in Chapter 
1, ideally, we would test large samples of a wide range of animal species, including 
humans, using several comparable paradigms. Of course, this is typically impossible for 
a single researcher or laboratory to accomplish; therefore, here I will focus on future 
work that can yield additional insights that does not require additional (nonhuman) 
animals.  
The present research can be extended in several directions. First, if comparison to 
human decision-making is an explicit goal, then whenever possible, humans should be 
tested in a paradigm that is as comparable as possible to the one used with animals. 
More generally, if the behavior of any two or more different species is compared, 
inferences will be greatly improved if a comparable methodology is used (Smith et al., 
2018; Tomasello & Call, 2011).  
Second, I see the most promising opportunities to expand on our knowledge of 
decision-making biases in exploring what explains variability in how susceptible 
animals are to a given effect. Future work should assess the magnitude of a number of 
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different biases in the same individuals and systematically 1) compare their relative 
importance on decision-making (as in Chapter 2) and 2) assess the extent to which they 
co-occur. Doing so helps us clarify the potential importance of different underlying 
mechanisms, the latter by highlighting the potential role of individual differences (such 
as those related to sex, age, social standing, specific cognitive ability) in the emergence 
of these biases. Further, comparing the behavior of the same individuals on different 
paradigms designed to test the same phenomenon can tell us to what extent they tap 
into the same concept. Similarly, comparing the behavior of the same individuals on the 
same paradigm, conducted after a hiatus, can tell us about the stability of the bias and 
the potential effect of experience on its emergence. 
Systematically testing and comparing the decision-making behavior of multiple 
species, including humans, is crucial to understanding how our strategies have evolved, 
which mechanisms give rise to them, and in which situations and environments they 
may have been adaptive. This dissertation has expanded on this understanding and 
opens up exciting avenues for future research that will help us better predict and, 
ultimately, overcome bad decision-making. 
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